National Health Care Program: What Its Effect Would Be On American Tort Law and Malpractice Law by Schwartz, Gary T.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 79
Issue 6 September 1994 Article 3
National Health Care Program: What Its Effect
Would Be On American Tort Law and Malpractice
Law
Gary T. Schwartz
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gary T. Schwartz, National Health Care Program: What Its Effect Would Be On American Tort Law and Malpractice Law ,
79 Cornell L. Rev. 1339 (1994)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol79/iss6/3
A NATIONAL HEALTH CARE PROGRAM:
WHAT ITS EFFECT WOULD BE ON AMERICAN
TORT LAW AND MALPRACTICE LAW
Gary T. Schwartzt
At a conference at the University of Hawaii in March 1992, I pre-
dicted that by the end of the century the United States would adopt a
national health program.' My prediction stemmed not from any as-
sumption on my part that Bill Clinton would become the next presi-
dent,2 but rather from my assessment of public attitudes about health
care. By the early 1990s the vast majority of Americans were protected
by health insurance. My sense was that a broad consensus had
emerged within public opinion, Democrats and Republicans alike,
that it is awful to face without insurance the massive bills produced by
modern medicine, and even more awful for Americans to be denied
needed health care because of a lack of insurance or wealth.3 Such a
consensus can easily foster legislation.
As it happens, most of the predictions I venture turn out to be
without any merit. Yet this prediction has proved to be at least quite
interesting. Over a year ago the President announced his own health
plan. At first its chances of enactment seemed reasonably good.
Nonetheless, after extensive discussions and politicking the plan was
essentially rejected by Congress. Congress also considered a variety of
other proposals, including the Chaffee plan, the Cooper plan, and the
Mitchell plan. Time eventually ran out for any congressional action
last term. This term will probably see Congress seriously considering
bipartisan, mainstream proposals that would significantly extend the
availability of insurance and hence move in the general direction of
universal coverage. Just as limited congressional civil rights initiatives
in 1957 and 1960 set the stage for comprehensive civil rights legisla-
t Professor, UCLA School of Law. Thanks to Samantha Ravich, Tom Rice, Elizabeth
Wehr, and Paul Weiler.
1 Gary T. Schwartz, Synthesis & Prospects: Concluding Remarks by the Participants, 15 U.
HAWAI L. Rrv. 524, 784, 787 (1993).
2 At the time, Clinton had the lead in the race for the Democratic nomination. But
all Democrats were then running second to the incumbent Republican; and Ross Perot was
rapidly gaining ground.
3 A week after the Cornell conference, polls showed that public opinion was divided
on the Clinton health plan itself. But a huge majority of the public-82%-regarded it as
'very important" that "every American receives health insurance coverage." Adam Clymer,




tion in 1964 and 1965, so a moderate health care bill in 1995 might be
the precursor of more dramatic reform in subsequent years.
Accordingly, it makes good sense for a torts scholar like myself to
assess what the impact of a national health care program would be on
American tort law. This Article first considers how the health care
benefits afforded by such a program should be accommodated or co-
ordinated with personal-injury tort awards: that is, what happens to
the collateral source rule? The Article concludes that the collateral
source rule in the traditional form is untenable: Unless a strategy of
subrogation can be rendered feasible, the rule should be abrogated in
its application to health care benefits. Next, the Article ponders how
the adoption of a national health care program would affect the
claiming patterns of tort victims, the attitudes of tortjuries in deciding
cases, and the development by judges of tort doctrine. Given the fore-
seeable effects, such a program, in achieving health care reform,
could also bring about tort reform, restraining the scope and cost of
the overall tort system.
Finally, the Article looks at the particular problem of medical
malpractice. The Article ignores the specific restrictions on malprac-
tice claims that various congressional proposals would impose. Most
of these restrictions are commonplace in state malpractice statutes,
and have been extensively studied by others. Instead, the Article as-
sesses how a national health care program would affect the entire eco-
nomic and legal environment within which instances of medical
malpractice occur. In the modern era, the combination of traditional
medical ethics and extensive fee-for-service health insurance has prob-
ably elevated the malpractice standard of care to a level higher than
that authorized by the Learned Hand test. A national health care pro-
gram, by accelerating the trends toward cost containment in general
and health maintenance organizations in particular, might succeed in
bringing the malpractice standard down to a proper Learned Hand
level. In addition, insofar as a national program would accelerate
those trends, that program would tend to affirm a new function for
the malpractice tort: that of offsetting the incentives for malpractice-
like underutilization that cost containment arrangements can entail.
Eventually, however, a national program might eclipse the traditional
malpractice tort in many settings by subordinating state malpractice
actions to new federal statutory standards.
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I
THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RuLE AND THE COORDINATION OF
HEALTH CARE BENEFITS WITH TORT AwARDs
In the modem era, half or more of tort awards relate to pain and
suffering, while the remainder compensate for economic costs. 4 Of
the latter, perhaps sixty percent go for income losses, while forty per-
cent arise from the costs of medical care.5 If a national health care
program is enacted, any accident victim would be entitled to that pro-
gram's insurance benefits. How should those benefits be accommo-
dated with the medical-expense portion of personal injury awards?
This is an essential question, which could be answered in one of three
ways.
A. Three Policy Alternatives
One option is to have no coordination at all: the victim can
promptly receive health insurance benefits and can later recover their
fair-market value in a tort suit. This, of course, is the practice of non-
coordinating duplication that is embodied in tort law's traditional col-
lateral source rule.
Second, the collateral source rule could be abolished in favor of
recognizing the primacy of health insurance. That is, the victim's
health care expenses could be covered exclusively by health insur-
ance, with no additional tort recovery for the same expenses. As part
of tort reform, the collateral source rule has by now been abolished in
several states.6
Third, tort law could be recognized as the exclusive remedy-
with health insurance bowing out when the victim's medical needs
result from a defendant's tortious conduct. To be sure, tort recoveries
are both chancy and delayed in a manner that makes this option seem
unattractive. Yet there are ways to implement the option that would
avoid this problem. For example, the victim could receive medical
benefits under health insurance, but the health insurer could then be
given a subrogated cause of action against the tortfeasor. Altema-
4 This statement is based on a study of New York State jury verdicts prepared by
Judith W. Pendell and John R. Evancho of the Aetna Life and Casualty Company. This
study was presented at a conference on Civil Justice Reform in the 1990s held at the New
York University Institute ofJudicial Administration on October 15, 1993. The papers from
that conference, including a revised version of the Aetna study, will be published by the
NYU Press.
5 Firm data on the internal allocation of tort awards for economic losses are not
available. Workers' compensation reimburses for both medical expenses and income
losses. Currently, health care accounts for about 41% of all workers' compensation awards.
SeeJohn F. Burton, Jr., National Health Care Reform and Worker' Compensation, inJoHN BuR-
TON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION MoNrroR, Nov./Dec. 1993, at 1, 3.




tively, the victim could secure a full tort recovery from the negligent
defendant, but could then be required to reimburse the health in-
surer for health service costs earlier provided. Whether the particular
technique is subrogation or reimbursement, the victim is denied a
double recovery and ultimate liability is placed on the torffeasor
rather than the health insurer.
To illustrate the option of subrogation, consider workers' com-
pensation, which from one perspective can be seen as an insurance
scheme arranged by employers to benefit employees. The employee
injured on the job by the tortious conduct of some third party can
secure immediate reimbursement for her medical bills from the em-
ployer; but the employer can then bring its own subrogated suit
against the third party, can intervene in the employee's tort suit, or
can secure a lien against the employee's tort recovery.7 Another illus-
tration of subrogation is afforded by the Federal Medical Care Recov-
ery Act, adopted in 1962, which specifies that whenever the federal
government is "authorized or required by law" to furnish medical serv-
ices to a person injured by a third-party tortfeasor, the government
"shall have a right to recover from [the] third party" for the services'
reasonable value." This statute is often applied once the federal gov-
ernment has provided health care to injured veterans.9 Medicaid,
which finances health care for the very poor, consists of programs ad-
ministered by states under federal supervision. In recent months, the
programs in Florida, Mississippi, and West Virginia have filed suit
against major tobacco companies, seeking reimbursement for pro-
gram outlays attributable to diseases allegedly caused by the compa-
nies' tortious conduct.10
To recap, the available policy options are the retention of the
collateral source rule, the outright abrogation of the rule, or recogni-
7 See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 3850-64 (West 1989).
8 See 42 U.S.C. § 2651 (1988).
9 E.g., United States v. Theriaque, 674 F. Supp. 395 (D. Mass. 1987). However, the
Federal Social Security Disability Insurance program is lacking in any statutory provisions
authorizing subrogation. See OFFiCE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, IMPACT OF LEGAL RE-
FORMS ON MEDICAL MALPRACrICE COSTS 35 (1993).
The federal Medicare program contains provisions which supersede the standards set
forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2651. See infra note 27.
10 In Mississippi the state's suit is based on the state's understanding of common-law
principles of subrogation. Telephone Interview with Tray Bobinger, Special Assistant to
the State's Attorney General (Aug. 2, 1994). In 1994, Florida enacted legislation enabling
the state's Medicaid program to secure reimbursement from tortfeasors. The Florida stat-
ute evidently requires the state to prove the tortious conduct of tobacco companies and
other defendants; yet the statute professes to eliminate affirmative defenses such as as-
sumption of risk and comparative negligence. See FLA. STAT. § 409.910, as amended, ch.
94-251 (1994).
Subrogation in California Medi-Cal is provided for by CAL. WELFARE & INST. CODE
§ 14134.71(a) (West 1991).
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tion of subrogation'1 as an alternative to the rule. When the tort
claim is for malpractice, the Clinton bill took a clear position: the
option of abrogation would become the law. 12 The victim's medical
expenses would be covered by health insurance, the victim would not
recover those expenses in a later malpractice action, and the health
insurer would not have a subrogated claim against the party guilty of
malpractice.' 3 Malpractice aside, the Clinton bill acknowledged the
general problem of coordination by calling for a Commission on Inte-
gration of Health Benefits. This Commission would have studied "the
feasibility and appropriateness of transferring financial responsibility
for all medical benefits... to health plans."1 4 One job of the Com-
mission, then, would have been to consider whether the collateral
source rule as applied to health care benefits should be abolished for
all cases of tort liability.
Of course, the collateral source rule is a creature of state law.
Even if a national commission recommends no federal action to dis-
place the rule, state lawmakers-both legislators and judges-would
presumably remain free to decide whether state law should accept the
collateral source rule as applied to health care benefits covered by any
new national program. Accordingly, my discussion of the rule here
has two audiences: a prospective national commission and state
lawmakers themselves.
B. Evaluating the Alternatives
Evaluation begins by considering the availability of insurance in
the nineteenth century, when American courts first adopted the
rule. 15 Markets for first-party insirance were only then developing.
Only a few plaintiffs were protected by health insurance, disability in-
surance, or life insurance. From the defendant's perspective, the
presence of insurance for the victim was a genuine fortuity, and the
presence of high policy-limits insurance was even more fortuitous. In
these circumstances, the core common-sense fairness ideas supporting
the collateral source rule were quite strong. Insurance was entirely a
matter of individual choice; most plaintiffs declined to exercise that
11 For convenience in exposition-and in line with common legal parlance-this Ar-
ticle will now employ the term "subrogation" to refer to both subrogation and reimburse-
ment, since their outcomes are essentially the same. Technically, reimbursement is a
supplement to the collateral source rule, while subrogation can be seen as an alternative to
the rule.
12 S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5305(1) (1993).
13 The Clinton bill also addressed the coordination of health care benefits and work-
ers' compensation. This coordination issue is considered by another article in this sympo-
sium. See Debra T. Ballen, The Sleeper Issue in Health Care Reform: The Threat to Workers'
Compensation, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1291 (1994).
14 S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 10201(c) (1993).
15 See, e.g., Harding v. Town of Townshend, 43 Vt. 536 (1871).
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choice; those who did buy insurance were behaving in a distinctly
thrifty way and were paying for insurance directly out of their own
pockets.
Compare this to the situation of collateral sources in the last de-
cades of the twentieth century, when many jurisdictions reconsidered
the collateral source rule. Most of the disability insurance that cur-
rently protects Americans is provided to all or most Americans as a
matter of federal law or other collective practices. Social Security Dis-
ability Insurance (SSD), financed by the Social Security payroll tax,
covers all Americans who, having spent a certain number of years in
the workforce, are then totally disabled for a period of at least a year;
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) provides means-tested benefits
to other Americans who suffer total disability. 16 Short-term disability
insurance is generally provided not by individual policies, but rather
by employers through sick-leave programs, and by public programs in
several states.17
As far as health-care expenses are concerned, only about one-
eighth of the population is without health insurance, although an ad-
ditional two-ninths have insurance policies with "inadequate" cover-
age.18 Put more affirmatively, about sixty-five percent of the
population have extensive health insurance, and over eighty-five per-
cent have health insurance in some form. That is, health insurance,
while by no means universal, has become very common. Moreover,
for most of those insured, the protection of insurance is not really a
matter of individual choice, thrift, and expense. Older Americans'
health insurance is provided by the federal government by way of
Medicare; the Medicaid program affords health insurance for low-in-
come welfare recipients.' 9 For most other Americans with health in-
surance, it is provided by employment-based group plans.20
Moreover, employer furnished group health insurance is not simply a
matter of bargaining between employer and employees. Rather, that
insurance tends to result from a large federal subsidy. Although the
money the employer pays for employee health insurance coverage is
essentially income that the employer furnishes to employees, the fed-
eral Internal Revenue Code declines to recognize this as taxable in-
16 See Kenneth Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort
Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injuy, 93 CoLuM. L. REv. 75, 83-
85 (1993).
17 See STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW 130 (1989).
18 See Abraham & Liebman, supra note 16, at 81-82.
19 Id. at 83.
20 Id. at 80 n.16.
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come.2' The Code hence makes health insurance a cheap way for
employers to provide important income-like benefits to employees.
On balance, then, high levels of health insurance and moderate
levels of disability insurance are now common practices rather than
exceptions. Moreover, this insurance is provided collectively rather
than through individual choice; indeed, much of this insurance is
either provided directly by government or promoted by strong gov-
ernment subsidies. As noted, the circumstances surrounding collat-
eral sources in the nineteenth century gave the collateral source rule
an enormous commonsense appeal. Dramatic changes in those cir-
cumstances by the late twentieth century have resulted in a loss of
much of that appeal. What remains would be eroded even further
were health insurance to become a right guaranteed by federal law to
all Americans and financed primarily by employers and the federal
government.22
In light of this analysis, note the special case of life insurance.
Though many states in recent years have abrogated the collateral
source rule, these abrogations have typically excluded life insurance.23
Similarly, the Clinton medical malpractice proposal would have abro-
gated the collateral source rule in its application to disability insur-
ance and health insurance-but not life insurance.2 4 Why should life
insurance be excluded from these abrogations? At least one explana-
tion is that life insurance continues to be acquired in accordance with
nineteenth-century norms.25 Many people purchase life insurance,
but others do not. Even for those who do buy life insurance, the face
amount varies dramatically from policy to policy, and remains a mat-
21 See I.R.C. § 106(a). This federal policy dates back to a 1943 special ruling by the
Internal Revenue Service. Ronald J. Vogel, The Tax Treatment of Health Insurance Premiums
As a Cause of Overinsurance, in NATIONAL HEALTH INsuRANCE: WHAT Now, WHAT LATER,
WHAT NEVER? 220, 223 (Mark V. Pauly ed., 1980). In 1982, the "cost" to the federal govern-
ment of this tax exemption exceeded the federal government's expenditures for Medicaid.
See Charles E. Phelps, Tax Policy, Health Insurance, and Health Care in MARKET REFORMs IN
HEA.TH CARE 198, 200 (Jack A. Meyer ed., 1983).
22 Granted, a tax or fee imposed on employers might, as a matter of"incidence," back
up and be paid by employees, at least in part. Yet all the various proposals for a national
health program would preserve much of the important federal tax subsidy. (For discussion
of the consensus in favor of this subsidy, see Michael Kinsley, Share the Health, NEw YORKER,
July 11, 1994, at 42, 48-49.) Moreover, most of the proposals recently considered by Con-
gress offered generous subsidies to low-income consumers and to small businesses which
would purchase insurance for their employees.
23 2 ALI REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE RFSPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 166
(1991). That is, even after abrogation, if the victim of a fatal accident is covered by a life
insurance policy, his family receives the proceeds of that policy, and can then recover in
full in a wrongful death action against any tortfeasor.
24 S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5305 (1993).
25 Another explanation is that a "whole" life insurance policy is a mixture of pure
insurance and a savings plan. Yet "term" life insurance, which also is quite common, is
insurance plain and simple.
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ter of individual choice.26 Furthermore, the cost of a life insurance
policy-including a policy with a high level of coverage-is borne by
the individual who purchases the policy. That we preserve the collat-
eral source rule in its application to life insurance suggests that when
collateral sources adhere to nineteenth-century norms we continue to
find the rule attractive. Yet the rule appears quite odd when society's
institutions provide insurance-like benefits to all or most persons with-
out much regard to individual choice and at little or no explicit indi-
vidual expense.
One illustration of the latter point is the federal Medicare pro-
gram, which does not allow double recovery by the accident victim.
Rather, Congressional amendments render Medicare a "secondary
payer"; Medicare does not reimburse health care expenses that have
already been paid for (or are expected to be paid for) by "liability
insurance" including "self-insur[ance]. "27 Illustrating the point in a
somewhat different way is the status of the collateral source rule in
certain foreign countries, such as England and Sweden. 28 In these
countries, the rule remains in effect for individually purchased collat-
eral sources, such as life insurance. But the rule is given a restricted
scope: it tends not to apply to benefits that are provided to most citi-
zens by national programs or other collective arrangements.29 Thus
in England the accident victim who has been treated by the National
Health Service cannot recover in tort for the fair market value of that
treatment;30 nor can the Swedish victim who has received medical
services from that country's social insurance program.3 '
As applied to collateral sources such as a national health care pro-
gram, then, commonsense notions of fairness fail to support the col-
lateral source rule,32 and the rule is increasingly rejected in foreign
legal systems. Even so, the rule can be defended on grounds of deter-
26 Social Security survivor's benefits are essentially a substitute for the retirement ben-
efits that the wage-earner would have been entitled to had he or she survived.
27 42 U.S.C. § 1395(b) (2) (A) (ii) (1988 Supp. IV).
28 See generally PETER CANE, ATIYAH'S ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION, AND THE LAw 325
(5th ed. 1993); Gary T. Schwartz, Product Liability and Medical Malpractice in Comparative
Contex in THE LABILrry MAZE 28, 74-75 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan, eds., 1991);
Patricia M. Danzon, The Swedish Patient Compensation System: Lessons for the United States, 15J.
LEGAL MED. 199 (1994).
29 See CANE, supra note 28, at 324-30; Danzon, supra note 28, at 213 & n.41.
30 SeeJOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 246 (8th ed. 1992).
31 See Danzon, supra note 28, at 202, 213-22.
32 Moreover, in these situations even more elaborate theories ofjustice provide the
rule with little or no support. ConsiderJules Coleman's recent account of correctivejus-
ice. According to Coleman, to the extent that society adopts social-welfare programs that
compensate for losses, principles of corrective justice do not impose on the tortfeasor any
obligation to afford a second round of compensation. JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND
WRONGS 403-04 (1992). Coleman derives from this particular finding an "inescapable
truth about corrective justice": that it is "conditional" on a variety of "social, political and
legal practices." Id. at 404.
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rence. To fully deter parties who might engage in tortious behavior,
those parties should be required to confront liability for all the costly
consequences of their tortious conduct. If, for example, the typical
injury caused by a defective power tool results in $4000 in medical
expenses, $6000 in lost income, and $10,000 in pain and suffering, a
tort regime that imposes liability for only $16,000 would run the risk
of losing twenty percent of its deterrence efficacy.
Of course, full deterrence could also be achieved by the third
option: allowing the victim to collect exclusively from her health in-
surer and then giving that insurer a subrogated cause of action against
the tortfeasor. This arrangement looks like it could achieve the best
of all possible worlds. The victim receives full (but not double) com-
pensation; for the sake of deterrence the tortfeasor bears full liability;
and in a competitive market the revenue derived from subrogation
requires the health insurer to reduce the price of the insurance poli-
cies it offers.
In evaluating the subrogation option, one needs an estimate of
how much deterrence in fact would be lost if the liability of tortfeasors
were reduced by (say) twenty percent. At this point, the economists'
models should be supplemented by a realistic and perhaps skeptical
appraisal as to how much deterrence the current tort system actually
provides.33 Moreover, evaluation of the option should also acknowl-
edge that subrogation carries with it a considerable overhead, the cost
of which must be debited against whatever the deterrence advantages
of subrogation might be. Indeed, these overhead costs are sometimes
prohibitive, persuading insurers to make no effort to enforce their
subrogation rights.
Emphasizing all the practical problems that surround subroga-
tion, the recent ALI Reporters' Study rejected it as a solution to the
problem of collateral sources.34 According to the study, subrogation
generally does not work now, and cannot be "rehabilitated" to work in
the future. Yet here the study seems unduly to limit its horizons, be-
cause experience shows that subrogation functions well in some con-
texts. For example, as noted above, the California employer who has
paid an injured employee in workers' compensation can then proceed
against a third-party tortfeasor by way of subrogation. When I ask law-
yers whether employers exercise their rights, I am told they do so "all
the time."35 Though the law relating to subrogation is complex,36
33 My own views on this point are set forth in Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic
Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REv. 377 (1994).
34 2 ALI REPoRTERS' STrUDY, supra note 23, at 170-71, 177-80.
35 Telephone Interview with Leonard Mandel (Apr. 27, 1994).
36 In California, for example, there are complicated rules under which the employer's
subrogation rights are scaled down to the extent that its negligence contributed to the
worker's injury. Arbaugh v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 43 Cal. Rptr. 608 (Ct. App. 1978).
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these complexities are simply absorbed into the thriving litigation
practice. Another example of subrogation in action is provided by
auto property-damage cases. Take the automobile accident in which
A negligently damages B's car, and A is then slow in acknowledging
his fault. When this happens, B can collect from her own collision
insurer, and that insurer can then bring a subrogation claim against A
and A's liability insurer. In fact, these subrogation claims are rou-
tinely asserted. The regional office of State Farm, one of southern
California's major auto insurers, includes a formal "Subrogation De-
partment." Most of the time, I am told, subrogation functions
smoothly; only in a minority of cases do "things get pretty involved."37
Admittedly, there are special features about auto accidents and
workers' injuries that contribute to the administratability of subroga-
tion. From information on the claim form the collision insurer re-
ceives from its insured, the insurer can usually figure out whether
there is some third-party motorist who would be a good target for a
subrogation claim. Moreover, the companies that write collision in-
surance policies also write liability insurance policies. All auto insur-
ance companies thus stand on equal footing; each can be on either
side of a subrogation claim. Given this equality of interest, the major
auto insurers in southern California have been able to enter into an
"intercompany arbitration agreement" that enables them to resolve in
a low-cost way particular subrogation claims that prove difficult to set-
tle.3 8 As far as workers' compensation is concerned, an employer's
stake in subrogation is especially large, since the employer bears liabil-
ity for both health care costs and income indemnity. Moreover, the
employer, unlike a mere health insurer, has immediate knowledge of
the circumstances of the accident, since the accident happens on the
job site and must be reported by the employer for purposes of work-
ers' compensation. Additionally, when the possible third-party
tortfeasor is a product manufacturer, the employer also knows the
product: the employer originally purchased the product from the
manufacturer.
While acknowledging these special features, one can still say that
the ALI Reporters' Study was premature in writing off as usually im-
practical the subrogation alternative. Indeed, the foreign experience
with subrogation seems promising. In Germany, a large percentage of
all tort claims are brought against defendants by insurance companies
and social-security agencies that provide benefits to victims under na-
tional mandates.3 9 In the Canadian province of Alberta, all hospitals
are part of a public hospital system, and Alberta's hospital legislation
37 Telephone Interview with Glen Linton (Apr. 20, 1994).
38 Id.
39 See B.S. MARKESINIS, THE GERMAN LAw OF TORTS 670-71 (2d ed. 1991).
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gives this system a subrogated claim against the tortfeasor who has
injured the patient. These claims, I learn, are "routinely" asserted,
with "little apparent hassle."40 This experience in Alberta seems espe-
cially relevant because it is close to home, and close to health insur-
ance as well.
But foreign successes may not be importable. Additional home-
work needs to be undertaken to identify the relevant variables that
determine here the administratability of subrogation. A commission
like that proposed by the Clinton bill would be in a good position to
do this homework. Such a commission, having conducted its own in-
quiries, could reach reliable findings as to when and at what cost sub-
rogation works. The remaining question concerns how much
deterrence would be lost were the collateral source rule reversed and
the quantum of tort liability hence reduced by (say) twenty percent.41
Certainly this question is in some sense "factual." Yet the relevant
facts-call them, perhaps, "counterfacts"-are not of the sort that
would conveniently yield themselves to a short-term commission inves-
tigation. Accordingly, the efforts of any federal commission can be
expected to go part of the way, but not all the way, toward providing
an adequate factual basis for an eventual congressional decision on
the application of the collateral source rule to health care benefits.
II
How A NATIONAL HEALTH CARE PROGRAM CouLD AFFEcr
THE TORT SySTEM
As discussed in Part I, adoption of a national health care program
could easily lead to the reversal of the collateral source rule, a reversal
that could reduce the size of tort awards by perhaps twenty percent.
As significant as such a reversal obviously would be, this is only one of
several ways in which a national program might affect the operation of
the tort system. Other possible effects are the subject of this Part,
which will discuss how a national program could moderate the litig-
iousness of accident victims, how it would relate to the propensities of
tort juries, how it might influence the attitudes and policies of tort
courts, and why it might be thought to contribute to the underlying
rate of accidents that give rise to tort claims.
40 Telephone interview with Professor Lewis Klar (Sept. 19, 1994).
41 My own sense is that a 20% reduction in the quantum of tort liability would in-
crease the rate of negligent conduct by perhaps five percent. (The background analysis
that supports this impression is provided in Schwartz, supra note 33.) Whether the admin-
istrative costs of subrogation (once they are determined) are less than the "costs" of such a




Many factors affect the inclination of accident victims to bring
suit. Certainly one of these factors is the economic hardship the vic-
tim suffers. A recent survey of tort plaintiffs conducted by the Rand
Corporation shows that fifty-two percent of those plaintiffs, in explain-
ing their decisions to sue, listed as "very important" the point that "I
needed someone else to pay me compensation because I had no other
way to cover all my expenses."42 These "expenses" can be the ordinary
costs of living that the victim can no longer pay when an injury inter-
rupts his income. The expenses can also be the victim's medical bills.
The Rand data indicate that the annual economic costs of accidents
are about $176 billion.43 Of this $176 billion, almost half (more than
$86 billion) is the cost of inpatient and outpatient medical care.
These are expenses that presumably would be covered by a national
health care program.44 Granted, about sixty-five percent of Ameri-
cans already are adequately insured for their health care expenses. 45
Even so, a national health care program would render "universal" the
scope of adequate insurance. Indeed, the limitations in current insur-
ance practices comprise the very problem that such a program is
designed to solve. Should the program be adopted, a much smaller
number of accident victims will encounter the hardship of medical
bills in the aftermath of injuries.
Asserting a claim can be a matter of psychological orientation; it
can also be a matter of rationally pursuing an economic asset. As Part
I noted, the adoption of a national health care program would proba-
bly result in the repeal of the collateral source rule (either its outright
abrogation or its replacement by subrogation). Should this happen,
whenever an accident victim and her lawyer consider whether to file a
tort claim they would know that the repeal of the rule has considera-
bly reduced the value of that claim. Several states, as part of 1970s tort
reform, have already abrogated the collateral source rule in medical
malpractice actions. The consequences of this trend have been con-
42 DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE
UNITED STATES 171 (1991) [hereinafter RAND INJURY STUDY).
43 Id. at 52-53.
44 An additional $11.5 billion of economic costs relate to "special equipment, home
health, etc." Id. Some of these additional costs might well turn out to be reimbursable
under a national health care program.
Still, it should be noted here that the National Safety Council's recent calculations
suggest that the income losses due to accidents considerably exceed medical expenses. See
NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACts 3 (1992). One explanation for this difference
in findings is that the Rand study did not include the economic costs offatalaccidents. See
RAND INJURY STUDY, supra note 42, at 8. These costs would be primarily income losses, not
medical expenses. Note also my prior assumption that about 40% of the economic losses
recoverable in tort are health care expenses. See supra text accompanying note 5.
45 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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sidered by recent empirical studies. While the results of these studies
have been mixed,46 some suggest that the abrogations have quite sig-
nificantly reduced not only the cost but also the number of malprac-
tice claims.4 7 The adoption of a national program with universal
coverage would increase to 100% the number of tort victims with ade-
quate health insurance. Should that adoption then lead to the repeal
of the collateral source rule, the combination of the rule's repeal and
universal coverage can be expected to noticeably reduce the number
of tort claims filed.
B. Juries
For both understandable psychological reasons and rational eco-
nomic reasons, then, if a national health care program is adopted
fewer tort suits (relative to the number of injuries) will be brought.48
When suits are brought, what can be said about the likely attitudes of
tort juries? Since the nineteenth century, the personal-injury bat in
the United States has believed that juries sympathize with injured vic-
tims and hence resolve many doubts in those victims' favor. It is rou-
tinely the plaintiff's rather than the defendant's lawyer who requests a
jury trial. Furthermore, when the evidence at trial favoring the defen-
dant is strong enough, the defendant's lawyer typically moves for a
directed verdict-fearing that the jury will disregard the evidence and
rule for the plaintiff. Yet when the evidence strongly supports the
plaintiff, his counsel generally refrains from asking for a directed ver-
dict. Confident that the jury will accept the evidence and rule for the
plaintiff, counsel sees no reason to incur the risk that a directed ver-
dict entered by the trial judge will be reversed on appeal.
To be sure, the accuracy of lawyers' views as to the proplaintiff
preferences of tort juries is somewhat difficult to confirm with empiri-
cal evidence. 49 But if the available evidence does not provide confir-
46 See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 9, at 69.
47 According to Patricia Danzon's work, repeal of the collateral source rule results in
a reduced claim frequency of 14% and a reduced claim severity of 18%. Patricia M.
Danzon, Malpractice Liability: Is the Grass on the Other Side Greener?, in TORT LAW AND THE
PUBLIC INTrEREsr 176, 197-98 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991). The effects found by Danzon
are larger than those noted in other empirical studies, yet her results have a ring of truth
about them. Given the pattern of collateral sources in modern America, the repeal of the
rule ought to produce the results she describes.
48 Tort liability doctrines in countries such as England, France, and Japan are not
much different from tort liability rules in the United States; yet the rate of litigation in
those countries is sharply lower than the rate in ours. While there are several reasons for
this, certainly one of them is that those countries provide accident victims with health care
and income-interruption benefits that both reduce the cash value of a tort claim and re-
lieve the accident victim of much of the potential economic hardship of his accident. See
Schwartz, supra note 28, at 74-76.
49 The plaintiff win rate is actually higher in cases tried by judges than in cases tried
byjuries. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Judge orJuiy: Transcending
1994] 1351
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
mation, neither does it deliver refutation;50 and it is hard to believe
that experienced tort lawyers misunderstand the basic directions of
jury decisionmaking. One can therefore accept without much diffi-
culty the lawyers' typical view that juries commonly sympathize with
injured victims.
That sympathy is certainly due, at least in part, to jurors' beliefs
that injured tort plaintiffs are experiencing real economic hardship.
While over eighty-five percent of Americans are currently protected by
some health insurance,51 the likelihood of insurance is a point that
juries might be unaware of, or might forget in the course of their de-
liberations. Indeed, because of the collateral source rule the jury can-
not be told that the plaintiff is covered by an ample health insurance
policy; and the jury could easily infer from the lack of evidence that
the victim is in fact without insurance coverage. Yet if a national pro-
gram featuring universal coverage is adopted, all accident victims will
have a federal right to insurance coverage for all their medical bills,
including those bills that result from injuries. Jurors will certainly be
aware of that right, both because of the enormous publicity generated
by the debate about health care reform and because the jurors will
receive their own health insurance through the new national pro-
gram. Their knowledge of universal coverage can be expected to re-
duce (though not eliminate) jurors' current tendency to resolve
doubts in favor of accident victims. In this respect, juries will be more
balanced in their appraisal of the evidence in tort cases. The conse-
quent reduction in plaintiffs' chances of winning will be appreciated
by the plaintiffs' bar. This too could reduce the number of suits filed.
C. Judges
Considered so far have been the attitudes of tort plaintiffs and
tortjuries. What about the attitudes of tortjudges? How might a na-
tional health care program affect the policy preferences of appellate
judges as they decide how broadly to define the scope of tort liability
rules? On occasion, new doctrines of liability are developed specifi-
cally to cover medical expenses. For example, in Potter v. Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co.52 the California Supreme Court recently held that the
person exposed to a toxic substance and hence subjected to a signifi-
Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1124 (1992). Moreover, the plaintiff win rate injury trials
has been going down in recent years. Edward Felsenthal, Juries Display Less Sympathy in
Injuy Claims, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 1994, at B1.
50 As Clermont and Eisenberg note, bench trials occur only in cases in which neither
side demands a jury; and there is no a priori reason to believe that these "no demand"
cases are a fair cross section of the larger set of all cases that go to trial. Clermont &
Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 1160, 1174.
51 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
52 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993).
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cant, but less than fifty percent, risk of developing a serious disease
can-even absent any current physical injury-recover for the "cost of
future periodic medical examinations intended to facilitate early de-
tection and treatment of [that] disease."53 Consider medical monitor-
ing services that would satisfy the Potter requirements of
"reasonableness and necessity."54 These services would almost cer-
tainly be deemed "medically necessary"55 by any national health care
program that Congress might adopt, and hence would be included
within that program's insurance coverage. With the program in place,
appellate judges, in considering whether to approve the Potter rule,
would undoubtedly be aware of this coverage.
So long as the collateral source rule remains in effect, approving
Potter would not mean that plaintiffs who would otherwise go uncom-
pensated will now receive compensation; rather, Potter would signify
that plaintiffs, having already been compensated once, can now re-
ceive a second round of compensation. The judges' likely lack of en-
thusiasm for this result would discourage them from endorsing Potter.
To be sure, the adoption of a national health care program might
induce either national or state lawmakers to remove medical benefits
from the scope of the collateral source rule. Should this happen,
judges' approval of the Potter cause of action would accomplish almost
nothing. The recovery that plaintiffs could claim under Potter would
be netted down to almost zero by the benefits paid under the national
program.5 6 Judges' perceptions of the futility of this outcome would
likely dampen their support for the Potter doctrine.57
But if a national health care program might influence judges' at-
titudes towards specific liability issues, the relevance of such a pro-
53 Id. at 821, 823-25. The Potter court also held that absent current physical injury a
plaintiff cannot recover forfear of acquiring a disease unless the future likelihood of con-
tracting the disease is more than 50%. Id. at 816. Of course, if this prospect is more than
50%, the plaintiff might be able to recover for the future disease itself, since it is a more-
likely-than-not consequence of present conditions.
54 Id. at 824.
55 See infra text accompanying notes 154-55.
56 Keep in mind that in most cases plaintiffs in Potter situations receive nothing for the
emotional distress they experience as they anticipate the possibility of future disease. See
supra note 53.
57 Now modify the earlier assumption, and assume that lawmakers replace the collat-
eral source rule with subrogation. If so, then the judicial endorsement of the Potter cause
of action would provide no immediate benefits to exposed plaintiffs. Nevertheless, a con-
cern for deterring potential toxic polluters might lead judges to express interest in Potter.
Indeed, it would be interesting to see to what extent judges would find persuasive a deter-
rence rationale for expanded liability when that rationale is essentially isolated from the
conventional practice of providing actual compensation to victims. Note McDougald v.
Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372 (N.Y. 1989), in which the NewYork Court of Appeals declined to
award damages for loss of enjoyment of life to a comatose plaintiff, reasoning that those




gram to tort liability doctrine can be assessed even more broadly.
Many scholars believe that a driving force operating on modem tort
law has been the desire of judges to provide compensation-that is,
insurance protection-to the victims of serious injury.58 In these
scholars' view, the insurance rationale for modem tort liability has di-
verted tort law from attending to its proper goals of deterrence 59 and
corrective justice. 60 My own view is that these scholars have seriously
overestimated the significance of the insurance criterion in the formu-
lation of modem tort doctrine.61 Yet even I acknowledge that a loss-
spreading impulse has operated as an undercurrent in modem tort
law, making it easier for trial judges to accept inappropriate jury find-
ings and encouraging appellate judges to reject or devalue legitimate
arguments against liability.62 If a national health care program is
adopted, judges would be aware that the insurance mandated by fed-
eral law now covers accident victims for the medical care they need.
Granted, those victims' income losses would remain; still, judges
might be less inclined to rely on loss-spreading notions to approve
either individual verdicts or new causes of action. If so, then the
growth of tort liability would be constrained.
D. Summarizing and Complicating
To recap, the adoption of a national health care program proba-
bly would restrain the number of tort suits filed, diminish the percent-
age of jury verdicts favoring plaintiffs, and dampen the willingness of
appellate courts to broaden the rules of tort liability. Furthermore, if
the program leads to the repeal of the collateral source rule, this
would reduce the size of tort verdicts by perhaps twenty percent. In
short, the implementation of a national program would tend to con-
strict both the effective scope and the actual cost of the current re-
gime of tort liability. At the least, that program would slow down the
rate at which the current tort system would otherwise grow. Either
way, health care reform would include important "tort reform" impli-
cations that have gone largely undiscussed. 6
58 See, e.g., George L. Priest, Modem Tort Law and Its Reform, 22 VAL. U. L. REv. 1
(1987); ErnestJ. Weinrib, The Insurance Justification and Private Law, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 681
(1985).
59 See Priest, supra note 58.
60 See Weinrib, supra note 58.
61 See Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American
Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REv. 601, 620-47 (1992).
62 Id. at 641-47.
63 They are, however, noted by Professor O'Connell in his article in this symposium.
Jeffrey O'Connell, Blending Reform of Tort Liability and Health Insurance: A Necessary Mix, 79
CORNELL L. REv. 1303 (1994). Moreover, O'Connell's discussion reaches a conclusion con-
trary to my own. O'Connell shows that recent decades have witnessed an expansion both of
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Having worked out these implications, I should now acknowledge
certain complicating factors. First, my discussion has assumed that a
national health care program would cover essentially all the health
care costs of accident victims. In fact, even a program as ambitious as
the Clinton plan anticipated leaving some costs to patients, including
a "cost sharing" charge for particular services and monthly insurance
premiums. Under the Clinton plan, the consumer who elected a
health maintenance organization (HMO) would have encountered
low fees for individual services6 and probably a low premium as
well. 65 On the other hand, the plan would have enabled consumers to
select a fee-for-service option that would have entailed a much higher
cost-sharing burden and probably a substantial premium. 66 Consum-
ers who enrolled in this option would have faced costs (especially after
an injury) that would be quite significant. But everyone would know
that all Americans have ready access to the lower-cost HMO. More-
over, most Americans would probably have elected the HMO, which
hence would be recognized as the "democratic" choice. Accordingly,
the person electing fee-for-service would be seen as willing to pay a
higher price in exchange for a more aristocratic arrangement.67 Ju-
rors and judges would probably perceive this person as having volun-
tarily assumed a financial risk, having knowingly accepted a financial
burden. Given this perception, juries and judges would not see that
burden as a circumstance justifying any special tort-law solicitude.
tort and of public and private insurance. O'Connell hence concludes that the increase in
insurance leads to more tort liability rather than to less.
The data presented by O'Connell are certainly relevant, and I commend his efforts in
bringing them together. Yet his evidence does not really prove that the growth in insur-
ance has caused the growth in tort; more precisely, O'Connell does not show that the ex-
pansion in tort would not have been more rapid had insurance coverage remained
constant.
Moreover, as noted above, a national health care program would be universal, official,
and dramatic in a way that is uniquely likely to affect the attitudes of judges and juries.
Also, O'Connell does not consider evidence suggesting that the repeal of the collateral
source rule has restrained medical malpractice claims. See Danzon, supra note 47.
Many insurance schemes-such as workers' compensation and Social Security Disabil-
ity-are so complex that the applicant feels the need to secure the services of a lawyer, who
is then in a good position to advise the victim of his tort prospects and to offer representa-
tion in any tort suit. Through this process, the provision of insurance can indeed "cause"
an increase in tort claims. By contrast, persons filing for health insurance do not usually
need or seek the services of a lawyer.
64 S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1135(a) (1993).
65 Hilary Stout, Freedom to Chose a Doctor is Dwdndling, Even Before Reforms, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 10, 1994, at Al.
66 Id.
67 An article in USA Today, describing "the health-care system of the future," indi-
cates that only "an affluent elite" will take advantage of fee-for-service plans. Managed care
will be the "Chevy" of health care, and fee-for-service the "Cadillac." Bill Montague, Pa-
tients Find Control Over Care Eroding, USA TODAY, Apr. 13, 1994, at 1A, 2A.
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Second, my treatment of the attitudes of judges and juries has
assumed that with about half the problem of the economic costs of
accidents solved by a national health care program, judges and juries
will feel significantly less inclined to tinker with tort law to protect
victims from serious accident losses. The contrary possibility is that
the adoption of such a program would reinforce a public ethic in
favor of socializing accident losses. If that ethic is so reinforced, then
juries and judges might become even more inclined to manipulate
tort law to socialize the income losses that accidents would continue to
bring about.68 While acknowledging this possibility, I still regard my
assumption as correct. Some supportive evidence comes from the
legal systems in England, Canada, Germany, and Japan. By 1960,
these countries had all adopted programs of national health insur-
ance. Yet as judges in those countries' have subsequently gone about
the business of fashioning tort doctrine, they seem to have given little
weight to the loss-spreading rationale for liability.69
In any event, what my analysis above has predicted is a smaller
number of lawsuits relative to the underlying number of injuries. Is
there any reason to believe that a national health care program would
increase the accident rate? Two possibilities should be noted here.
One concerns the subsidy that a national health care program might
provide to injurers; the other, the subsidy that the program would
confer on accident victims. The former subsidy might increase the
rate of tortious conduct; the latter subsidy might increase the amount
of risky and careless conduct engaged in by potential accident victims.
Injurers would receive a subsidy if a national health care program
leads to the outright abrogation of the collateral source rule. While
basic economic theory predicts that such a reversal would significantly
increase the number of tortious accidents, the accuracy of such pre-
dictions should be reviewed in a realistic and perhaps skeptical way.70
To recap the analysis developed in Part I above,71 policymakers should
abrogate the rule outright only if a realistic review finds that this abro-
gation would not result in a significant increase in the accident rate.
Should such a review conclude that there would be a meaningful in-
68 Public approval of the loss distribution ethic may well have influenced judges and
juries during the late 1960s and 1970s. Schwartz, supra note 61, at 635-38. My sense, how-
ever, is thatjudges andjuries are no longer as susceptible as they once were. Id. at 683-702.
69 I rely here on the review of these countries' tort opinions that I undertook in pre-
paring an earlier article. See Schwartz, supra note 28.
In all of these countries, tort cases are decided by judges rather than juries. There-
fore, none of these countries' experiences can provide evidence of how the adoption of a
national health care program affects the attitude ofjuries.
70 See supra text accompanying note 33.
71 See supra text accompanying notes 32-41.
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crease, then policymakers, rather than simply repealing the rule,
should replace it with subrogation.
A national health care program could subsidize accident victims
by offering its insurance benefits even to those who engage in high-
risk activities (such as motorcycling) and even to those who, while en-
gaging in ordinary activities, display a clear lack of care (such as jay-
walking, driving while intoxicated, or standing on the unstable top
rung of a ladder). 72 In affording first-party health insurance to all
accident victims, a national program would evidently make no effort
to experience-rate the price of insurance to account for the victims'
risky or careless behavior.7 3 Accordingly, economic theory predicts
that such a program would increase the rate of risky or careless con-
duct by potential victims and hence increase the number of acci-
dents.74 To be sure, this federal subsidy would go only so far:
accident victims would continue to face uninsured income losses, pain
and suffering, and the risk of death. Moreover, the economic analysis
may lack realism in the very high degree of "rationality" it imputes to
the conduct of potential accident victims.75
Still, even if the economists' concerns are exaggerated, the prob-
lem's core is certainly worth worrying about.7 6 One response would
be to impose fees on high-risk activities. Current proposals to boost
the cigarette tax can be interpreted in this light. Another response
would be to strengthen the regulatory controls that protect people
from unduly exposing themselves to risk. Examples include regula-
tions that prohibit jaywalking and require the wearing of seatbelts and
72 Of course, over 85% of Americans currently have some health insurance, and
about 65% have adequate health insurance. See supra text accompanying note 18. The
assessment in the text therefore depends on the extent to which a national program would
broaden insurance coverage.
73 In 1987, George Priest praised first-party insurance for the way in which it effi-
ciently segregates insureds into discrete risk pools. See George L. Priest, The Current Insur-
ance Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96 YAIE LJ. 1521, 1539-50 (1987). In truth, in light of
Medicare, Medicaid, and employer-provided group health plans, it is doubtful that first-
party health insurance as of 1987 deserved this praise. At any rate, a national health care
program would make no effort to establish subcategories of insureds for purposes of fixing
the price of insurance coverage. Such a program would adopt, as a matter of principle, the
practice of community rating. See Robert Pear, Pooling Risks and Sharing Costs in Effort to
Gain Stable Insurance Rates, N.Y. TIMEs, May 22, 1994, at 22.
74 SeeJon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic
Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 Com i.u. L. R v. 129, 167-68 (1990) (arguing that stan-
dardized premiums in first-party insurance sharply reduce potential victims' incentives to
exercise care and make prudent choices).
75 See Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisa; 87 YALE
LJ. 697, 713-21 (1978).
76 A significant number of persons who receive benefits under New Zealand's acci-
dent compensation plan have suffered injuries while riding motorcycles or playing rugby.
Sir Geoffrey Palmer, The New Zealand Experience, 15 U. HAW. L. Rtrv. 604, 642-43 (1993).




safety helmets. With the burden of medical care having been dramati-
cally socialized, the objection that these regulations are unduly pater-
nalistic would diminish in force.
III
THE CHANGING ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ENVIRONMENT FOR
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
Parts I and II of this Article have considered the ways in which a
national health care program could affect the entire tort system. The
Article now focuses on the medical malpractice portion of the tort
system. I shall not attempt to assess the particular restrictions on mal-
practice claims that various congressional proposals would impose:
regulation of the contingent fee, periodic payments at the request of
either party, certificate-of-merit requirements, mediation and other
forms of alternative dispute resolution, and caps on pain-and-suffering
damages.77 These are the familiar staples of state malpractice reform
statutes, and have been adequately discussed in other commentary.
Rather, my objective is to analyze how a national health care program
might contribute to the economic and legal environment within
which instances of medical malpractice (and also defensive medicine)
occur.
A. Fee-For-Service Insurance and the Problem of Overutilization
Developing this analysis calls for the perspective of recent history.
In 1940 only ten percent of Americans were covered by health insur-
ance. 78 Most of the technology that is characteristic of modern
medicine had not yet been developed; in this sense, there often was
not all that much doctors could do for their patients. 79 In considering
expensive diagnostic tests or treatments, doctors would have consid-
ered the fact that their patients would pay for these services. When
doctors did recommend a test or procedure, patients might decline
on grounds that it would cost too much.80 For whatever combination
of reasons, the annual per capita expenditure on health care in 1940
77 All but the last of these were included in the Clinton plan. S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. §§ 5301-06 (1993). The bill developed by the Senate Finance Committee would have
placed a $250,000 ceiling on pain-and-suffering awards. See Bob Herbert, Punishing the
Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1994, at A15.
78 Burton A. Weisbrod, The Health Care Quadrilemma: An Essay on Technological Change,
Insurance, Quality of Care & Cost Containment 29J. ECON. Lrr. 523, 523 (1991).
79 E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard of Medical Care, 75 CAL. L. Rv.
1719, 1726 (1987) ("Prior to World War II, physicians had few interventions, costly or
otherwise, to offer patients.").
80 Note, however, one famous nineteenth-century malpractice case which suggested
that a physician, having accepted a low-wealth individual as a patient, might be required to
provide without charge those medical services which the patient turns out to need. Becker
v. Janinski, 15 N.Y.S. 675, 677 (C.P. 1891):
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was very low. As late as 1950, this expenditure was only $332. Having
increased to $482 by 1960, it then leaped to $891 in 1970, $1291 in
1980, and $2105 in 1991.81
After World War II there was huge growth in private health insur-
ance, typically provided by employers operating under the spur of a
federal tax subsidy. Moreover, in the mid-1960s Congress created the
Medicare and Medicaid programs, providing health insurance for
older Americans and low-income Americans on welfare. Most of this
insurance was on a simple fee-for-service basis. Health insurers would
routinely pay for the reasonable cost of whatever services doctors
deemed appropriate for their patients.
Especially since fee-for-service arrangements remain an impor-
tant part of today's health care system, it is useful to assess the incen-
tives these arrangements provide to doctors and patients. Consider a
diagnostic test or a treatment procedure that is quite expensive but
which nevertheless provides the patient with a possible benefit. In
one out of every 200 cases, for example, it renders possible a diagnosis
that would elude a less expensive test; or in one of 100 cases it im-
proves the patient's health in a way that a less expensive procedure
would not. Both this diagnostic test and this method of treatment,
while certainly costly, provide the patient with a small but positive ex-
pected value.8 2 Operating under fee-for-service, the physician would
be inclined to order the test or treatment. The physician's inclination
is in large part due to his sense of his patient's best interests. The test
is possibly advantageous; and its cost is no problem for the patient,
who is adequately covered by insurance. For that matter, the cost is
no problem for the doctor, since it will be borne not by him but by a
third-party health insurer. The doctor might feel there is no particu-
lar reason to give serious consideration to the economic interests of
the insurance company. This is a prime example of what economists
call "moral hazard":83 the doctor and the patient can agree on tests
and treatments that benefit the patient while exporting the relevant
costs to a third party who is uninvolved in the decisionmaking.
Indeed, the doctor-patient relationship turns out to provide an
interesting set of added dimensions to the moral hazard problem.
Whether the patient be a pauper or a millionaire .... the physician owes
him precisely the same measure of duty, and the same degree of skill and
care.... [The physician] cannot defeat a suit of malpractice... upon the
principle that the skill and care required of a physician are proportioned to
his expectation of pecuniary recompense.
81 These expenditures are all expressed in 1983 dollars. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HELTH
& HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH UNITED STATES 1992, at tbl. 114 (1993). In nominal dollars,
the per capita expenditure in 1950 was $80; in 1991, $2868.
82 This is the economist's term, as employed in Weisbrod, supra note 78, at 527.
83 See Mark V. Pauly, Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Role of Moral
Hazard and Adverse Selection, 88 Q. J. ECON. 44 (1974).
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Under fee-for-service, the doctor can easily conclude that it is morally
inappropriate for him to take the insurer's interests into account. As
a conscientious doctor, his duty runs to the patient alone; according
to the traditional understanding, the doctor is a "fiduciary" for the
patient.8 4 One doctor has set forth a conventional understanding of
his role: "[Als a physician, I have been taught throughout my profes-
sional career that I had an absolute obligation to my patients to pro-
vide them with the highest quality medical care within my reach,
almost without regard to cost."8 5 This, indeed, is the doctor's "profes-
sional imperative."86
Moreover, if providing costly services to the patient gives the pa-
tient some expected value, then providing those services is also within
the economic self-interest of the doctor. Doctors can charge their pa-
tients' health insurers, often with a substantial markup, for those tests
and procedures that doctors provide within their own offices. Lab
tests are "a great source of income [for doctors]. You can significantly
increase your average bill per patient."87 Blood-cholesterol tests, for
example, cost a doctor about $2, but the doctor can bill tie health
insurer within a range from $8 to $22.8 To be sure, perhaps only a
small percentage of doctors order tests for the explicit purpose of in-
creasing their income. Yet as Gregg Easterbrook points out, "every
doctor knows at some subconscious level that additional procedures
are financially beneficial-and human nature dictates that what is in
the back of the mind can be as influential as what is in the front."8 9
In short, under conventional fee-for-service insurance doctors'
sense of their fiduciary obligation is reinforced by the doctors' eco-
nomic self-interest, creating powerful incentives to order tests and
conduct procedures whose expected health value (while positive) is
less than their economic cost.
84 See Tracy v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 569 N.E.2d 875, 879 (Ohio 1991);
Arnold S. Relman, M.D., What Market Values Are Doing to Medicine, ATLAIrrc, Mar. 1992, at
99, 100, 106.
85 Phillip Caper, M.D., The Meaning of Quality in Medical Care, 291 NEv ENG. J. MaD.
1136, 1136 (1974).
Another doctor has expressed his sense of his obligation as follows:
[P]hysicians are required to do everything that they believe may benefit
each patient without regard to costs or other societal considerations. In
caring for an individual patient, the doctor must act solely as that patient's
advocate, against the apparent interests of society as a whole, if necessary.
Norman G. Levinsky, M.D., The Doctor's Master, 311 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1573, 1573 (1984).
86 Jan Blustein & Theodore R. Marmor, Cutting Waste by Making Rules: Promises, Pit-
falls, and Realistic Prospects, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1543, 1563 (1992).
87 Glen Ruffenach, Medical Tests Go Under the Microscope; WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 1989, at
BI (quoting the president of a medical consulting firm).
88 Id.
89 Gregg Easterbrook, The Revolution in Medicine NwswEE, Jan. 26, 1987, at 40, 49.
According to one hospital president, "[t]he incentives were to keep people in the hospital,
to perform more tests and procedures, to increase costs." Id. at 43.
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With this in mind, we can consider the general standards of mal-
practice liability. The malpractice concept is typically seen as the doc-
trine of negligence as applied to physicians; furthermore, the
negligence doctrine itself is often understood in the cost-benefit terms
of the Learned Hand formula.90 In fact, however, the primary inter-
pretation of the malpractice doctrine is not the cost-benefit test but
rather the content of professional customs and standards. The doctor
who complies with professional customs cannot be found guilty of
malpractice; the doctor who departs from custom can easily be held
liable. It is commonly suggested that the professional custom stan-
dard may well operate at a lower level than the cost-benefit standard;
accordingly, the former standard is seen as providing a liability shelter
for the doctor who could properly be found negligent if the latter
standard were applied.91
I support here a contrary interpretation.92 In an environment of
unregulated fee-for-service insurance, the common and customary
practices among physicians can easily become more protective of pa-
tients and less attentive to economic costs than those practices that
would be called for by the Learned Hand test. Take a set of X-rays
that provide a diagnostic benefit, but so infrequently as to inade-
quatelyjustify the X-rays' monetary costs. The doctor who fails to or-
der these X-rays may be complying with the Learned Hand test for
nonnegligence. Yet in a fee-for-service setting, the incentives operat-
ing on doctors could easily result in such X-rays becoming a standard
practice. 93 Once this happens, the "professional" malpractice stand-
ard sets itself at a level that is "higher" than the cost-benefit standard.
Accordingly, doctors who decline to order such X-rays would be ex-
posing themselves to malpractice claims. Their interest in preventing
those claims gives them yet another reason to order the X-rays, even
though the economic analyst might deride the X-rays as excessive de-
fensive medicine.
90 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (conduct is
negligent if magnitude of risk exceeds cost of risk prevention).
91 See, e.g, PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 19-21 (1991).
92 For an earlier suggestion of this, see Randall Bovbjerg, The Medical Malpractice Stan-
dard of Care: HMOs and Customary Practice, 1975 DuKE LJ. 1375, 1394-95.
93 During this period dominated by fee-for-service insurance, there was a massive flow
of new technology into the medical system. The availability of new technology certainly
contributed to the remarkable increase in per capita medical costs. More precisely, new
technology interacted with the incentives afforded by fee-for-service insurance to provide a
mechanism whereby new technology would be promptly adopted by the medical commu-
nity. In this way fee-for-service arrangements increased the extent to which new technol-
ogy raised the overall cost of medical services. Moreover, since firms engaging in R&D
certainly took potential profits into account, the unregulated fee-for-service system pro-
vided an encouragement for the development of new medical technology. See Weisbrod,
supra note 78, at 528. This seems like one advantage of that unregulated system.
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B. Modem Arrangements and the Possible Problem of
Underutilization
What has happened, then, to the practice of medicine since the
mid-1970s? The relevant changes can easily be seen as a response to
the problems of cost overruns which by the mid-1970s had become
quite noticeable. Fee-for-service insurance programs remain; but they
now are subject to various forms of cost containment, including utili-
zation review as a condition for initiating or continuing various treat-
ments. 94 Moreover, new institutions have emerged that rearrange the
relationship between insurers and doctors. Several of these fall within
the category of health maintenance organization. HMOs receive in-
surance premiums at the beginning of the year in exchange for prom-
ising to provide medical services during the year. In a "staff model"
HMO, the HMO hires its own physicians, who provide medical serv-
ices as salaried employees. In a "group model" HMO, the HMO con-
tracts with a physician practice group, which provides medical
services. In an "independent physician association (IPA) model"
HMO, the HMO contracts with a considerable number of physicians
who have their own offices.
Another new institution is the preferred provider organization
(PPO). A PPO somewhat resembles an IPA-model HMO. Commonly
administered by an insurance company, the PPO enters into contracts
with a network of doctors and hospitals. By promising to deliver a
flow of patients, the PPO can secure their services at discounted
prices. 95
94 These reviews are most common for hospitalization and surgery. Utilization review
is also often required for certain particularly expensive procedures such as CAT-scans and
magnetic resonance imaging. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Insurers Second-Guess Doctors, Provoking
Debate Over Savings, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 24, 1993, at Al, A22. A fee-for-service plan offered to
UCLA employees requires the insurer's precertification for a list of approximately a dozen
tests and treatments, including gastroscopy, colonoscopy, speech therapy, and physical
therapy.
Within the Medicare program, a prospective payment system has been in effect since
1983 as a way of paying hospitals. The patient's medical problem is classified within a
particular "diagnostic related group" (DRG); the hospital's fee is then the fee associated
with that DRG. LouisE B. RUSSELL, MEDICARE'S NEW HosPrrAL PAYMENT SYsTEM: Is IT
WORKING? 9 (1989). Also, physicians participating in Medicare face a system of retrospec-
tive reviews for the services they provide. If such a review finds that the service was not
medically necessary, then the doctor is denied payment Robert A. Rosenblatt, Study Finds
More Medicare Claims in Southland Rejected LA. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1994, at A3, A16.
95 There are also many health plans that provide various kinds of "hybrids." UCLA,
for example, offers a hybrid plan that includes both HMO and fee-for-service. The pre-
mium that UCLA and the employee pay is primarily in exchange for the HMO's basic
services. But the employee remains free to consult a doctor outside of the HMO. An
employee who does so pays a larger portion of that doctor's fee than would be called for in
the typical fee-for-service plan. Patients like myself find hybrid plans attractive because
these plans enable patients to escape the psychological claustrophobia of confining them-
selves in advance to the list of the particular doctors employed by the HMO. But the
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During the last twenty years, then, the institutional arrangements
for the delivery of medical care have become diverse. The number of
patients in fee-for-service plans has decreased, and those plans are
now subject to significant cost controls. As late as 1975, only 6.5 mil-
lion Americans were enrolled in HMOs, 96 and PPOs did not yet exist.
However, between 1985 and 1991 the number of persons in either
HMOs or PPOs increased from twenty-five million to ninety million.97
By 1993, forty-two percent of the employees working for large compa-
nies were signed up in fee-for-service plans, but twenty-six' percent
were enrolled in HMOs, twenty-two percent in PPOs, and ten percent
in hybrid plans.98
Malpractice law is often concerned with the care or skill em-
ployed by doctors as they deliver particular medical services. There is
no particular reason for believing that the ongoing shift in institu-
tional arrangements is exerting any detrimental effects on the levels of
care and skill that doctors exercise. Accordingly, the discussion below
does not profess any particular relevance to the malpractice doctrine
in these applications.
Malpractice law, however, is also concerned with the medical serv-
ices-those tests and treatments-that doctors choose to deliver. The
revised arrangements do dramatically alter the incentives for furnish-
ing a variety of those services. Under unregulated fee-for-service, the
relevant decisions were made by doctors, who could perceive a variety
of reasons for ordering plenty of tests and procedures. Yet once a fee-
for-service insurance company establishes a cost-containment pro-
gram of utilization reviews, the company is in a good position to with-
hold utilization approvals so as to enhance its end-of-year net
revenues. PPOs likewise engage in utilization reviews. In addition,
the PPO, in reviewing its list of preferred providers, has an incentive
to remove from this list those doctors whose tests and services exceed
financial targets. PPOs act on the basis of this incentive. Doctors who
order large numbers of expensive tests can find themselves "purged"
from PPOs.9 Insurers assert that their right to "select and 'de-select'
doctors is at the heart of their ability to develop networks that provide
high-quality, cost-effective care." 100 Unfortunately, doctors who deal
with PPOs frequently perceive that "high quality" is not the primary
convenience of remaining within the HMO, in combination with the high cost of going
outside, means that most patients remain in the HMO for almost all their medical needs.
96 Bovbjerg, supra note 92, at 1394 n.59.
97 Ron Winslow & Edward Felsenthal, Physicians Fight Back as Insurers Cut Them firom
Health Networks, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1993, at Al.
98 See Milt Freudenheim, H.M.O.'s That Offer a Choice Are Gaining in Popularity, N.Y.
TMEs, Feb. 7, 1994, at Al. For additional data, see Montague, supra note 67, at 2A-




criterion: according to the general counsel of the American Medical
Association, "if you are a cheap doctor, you are going to be in the
[PPO] plan, whether you are good or bad."10 1 To the extent that this
AMA spokesman is professing to describe all PPOs, he is obviously
overgeneralizing. Still, he has correctly identified an incentive that
naturally operates on PPOs.
HMOs operate under somewhat similar incentives. Having re-
ceived premiums at the beginning of the year, the HMO has an obvi-
ous reason to hold down the volume of services it delivers during the
year. 10 2 In response to this incentive, HMOs commonly establish sys-
tems of utilization review. Yet these reviews typically reach only a
small fraction of the decisions rendered by the HMO's treating physi-
cians. These physicians' understanding of their own "professional im-
perative"'03 might discourage them from conserving on tests and
treatments. 04 For that matter, a commonplace observation within the
academic literature is that "agents" do not always behave in ways that
promote the interests of their "principals."1 05 It is not surprising,
then, that HMOs have developed a variety of techniques to encourage
physicians to conserve. 106 Many HMO primary-care physicians are
101 Id.
102 Since this subpart of my Article will identify problems associated with HMOs, it
should be noted here that HMOs can also improve the quality of care. There can be
coordination advantages when medical services are provided by a physician group. Also,
groups of physicians can better engage in peer review. In addition, HMOs have a basic
economic interest in persuading their patients to give up unhealthy practices such as smok-
ing and overeating. Ron Winslow, An HMO Tries Talking Members into Healthy Habits, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 6, 1994, at B1.
103 See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
104 Generational factors are influential here. The older generation of physicians is
most likely to feel the force of this professional imperative. Younger physicians have en-
tered the profession during the era of cost controls, and are much less likely to find these
controls offensive. George Anders, Changes in Medicine Wen the Usual Gap Among Practi-
tioners, WALL ST. J., June 20, 1994, at Al.
105 See, e.g., WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUsINESS ORGANIZATION AND Fi-
NANCE 31-44 (5th ed. 1993).
106 The following discussion draws on Alan L. Hillman, Financial ncentives forPhysicians
in HMOs: Is There a Conflict of Interest?, 317 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1743 (1987); Alan L. Hillman
et al., How Do Financial Incentives Affect Physicians' Clinical Decisions and the Financial Perform-
ance of Health Maintenance Organizations?, 321 Nw ENG.J. Ma. 86 (1989); Alan L. Hillman
et al., ContractualArrangements Between HMOs and Primay Care Physicians: Three-Tiered HMOs
and Risk Pools, 30 MED. CARE 136 (1992); W.P. Welch, The New Structure of lndividual Practice
Associations, 12J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 723, 724 (1987); W.P. Welch et al., Toward New
Typologiesfor HMOs, 68 MILBANK Q. 221 (1990).
What about the fee-for-service insurance company which establishes a cost-contain-
ment program? In fact, fee-for-service insurers have often adopted procedures that estab-
lish the "independence" of physician consultants who render the cost containment
decisions on behalf of the insurers themselves. Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health
Insurers'Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1637, 1670 (1992). HMOs, how-
ever, have declined to adopt such "procedural safeguards." Id. at 1683 n.169. See the story
of the Fox case, as discussed below in the text accompanying notes 136-41.
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paid on a "capitation" basis. 107 That is, for a given time period they
receive a fixed sum for each of their enrolled patients. Accordingly,
every service the physician provides to a patient (including referrals to
specialists) reduces the net revenue left to the physician at the end of
the time period. Alternatively, physicians are paid an annual salary.
But a significant fraction of that salaryo-often twenty percent-is
withheld until the end of the year; whether this withhold is then
turned over to the doctor depends on whether the doctor's service
costs remain below a pre-established target.108 Under other arrange-
ments, the doctor is given a bonus if her aggregate service costs dur-
ing the year are less than the pre-established figure. For doctors
subject to such withholds and bonuses, their annual income within a
considerable middle range is unaffected by the treatment choices they
make. Still, at the bottom and the top, the regime of withholds and
bonuses means that each service the doctor provides comes out of her
own pocket.
On other occasions the capitation payment, or the system of with-
holds and bonuses, is addressed not to the individual physician but
rather to physician groups. This shift in focus obviously reduces the
extent to which the payment system is likely to affect the choices physi-
cians render. Still, depending on the number of physicians in the
group and the degree of their interaction, physicians can establish in-
formal standards. As one physician in a group-model HMO recently
indicated, "we don't get paid if we go over budget."10 9 He also de-
scribed discussions held among the physicians within his group to es-
tablish informal norms or practices. In line with one of those norms,
the HMO's physicians insist that emotionally depressed patients take
Prozac for six weeks before the physician is willing to give serious con-
sideration to referring the patient out for psychotherapy. In line with
another norm, the HMO's physicians attempt to dissuade their under-
fifty women patients from insisting on mammograms. Accordingly,
"our mammogram rate is about as low as you can get.""10
The trend toward cost containment, and especially towards
HMOs and HMO-dominated hybrids, would clearly be reinforced,
and would almost certainly be accelerated, by the national health care
plans recently considered by Congress."' Both the Cooper plan and
107 Welch et al., supra note 106, at 224-25.
108 Id. at 126-27.
109 Robert Brook, M.D., Remarks at the Rand Corporation Seminar on the Legal Im-
plications of Health Care Reform (Feb. 25, 1994).
110 Id.
111 One recent article points out that "health system reform legislation" could "greatly
increase incentives" facing patients in a way that would "speed enrollment shifts from in-
demnity insurance to HMO plans." Robert H. Miller & HaroldJ. Luft, Managed Care Plan
Performance Since 1980: A Literature Analysis, 271 JAMA 1512, 1518 (1994).
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the Chaffee plan would have rendered nonincludible as employee in-
come only the employer-provided health insurance premium needed
to purchase the least expensive health-insurance plan locally avail-
able' 2-which almost certainly would be an HMO. The Clinton bill
would have required each local health plan to offer an HMO option, a
fee-for-service option, and a hybrid option.11 3 Yet the fee-for-service
option would have made the patient pay a higher annual deductible, a
higher per visit cost-sharing fee, and probably a higher annual pre-
mium. 1 4 Accordingly, the vast majority of persons would have pre-
dictably elected the HMO, or some hybrid primarily featuring an
HMO.
The good news about HMOs and utilization review programs is
that they can do a much betterjob than unregulated fee-for-service in
avoiding the costs of excessive defensive medicine. Indeed, the
HMOs' ability to inhibit excessive defensive medicine is a primary rea-
son public policy has favored their formation."15 By combining the
provision of insurance and the furnishing of services within the same
organization, HMOs are in a good position to solve the problem of
moral hazard. The bad news is that the incentives operating on
HMOs and cost-containment programs can go too far, 116 facilitating a
significant number of incidents of medical malpractice, at least when
malpractice is itself defined in conventional Learned Hand cost-
112 Hilary Stout, Freedom to Choose a Doctor is Dwindling; Even Before Reforms, WALL ST.J.,
Feb. 10, 1994, at Al, A6.
"13 S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1131 (1993). On hybrids, see supra note 95.
114 The Clinton bill would have required the employer to pay at least 80% of the aggre-
gate of the health insurance premiums for all its employees. Id. § 6131(b) (1) (A). But the
employer's share of the employee's particular health insurance plan could have varied
depending on which plan the employee chose. Most observers assumed that the employer
would have ended up paying more than 80% for the HMO and less than 80% for fee-for-
service. One health care analyst, for example, estimated that the employer would have
paid the entire premium for an HMO but less than half the premium of a fee-for-service
plan. Montague, supra note 67, at 2A (citing Tom Beauregard, with Hewitt Associates, a
consulting firm).
115 "The presence of [financial] risk [borne by the HMO] creates the incentives for
cost containment that have made HMOs so attractive to policy makers." Harold S. Luft,
Assessing the Evidence of HMO Performance, 58 MiLBANK HE LTH & Soc'y 501, 504 (1980).
The balance of the empirical evidence gathered to date shows that HMOs somewhat re-
duce hospital admission rates, clearly shorten the duration of hospital stays, and result in a
lower rate of utilization of expensive tests and procedures. Miller & Luft, supra note 111, at
1514-15. Yet the studies reaching these findings are generally not able to distinguish be-
tween cost-effective reductions in utilization and reductions that might count as malprac-
tice. Indeed, what evidence there is suggests that the overall quality of care in HMOs is
roughly equivalent to the quality found in more traditional medicine. Id. at 1516.
116 Oregon's new health plan relies on monthly capitation payments to physicians for
low-income patients. According to one Oregon internist, "It]he problem with old fee-for-
service medicine was that the incentive was to do more. The problem with capitation ... is
that the incentive is to do less." Marilyn Chase, Rationed Health Care Helps Oregon's Poor, But
Real Test Is Ahead, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 1994, at Al, A8 (quoting Dr. Gregg Coodley).
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benefit terms.'17 Indeed, during the 1994 Congressional debates,
"lawmakers [tried] to outdo one another with horror stories about"
HMOs that "skimp on care to save money." 18
Note, however, that the bad news evaluation rendered above re-
lied primarily on the short-term incentives that operate on health main-
tenance organizations and cost containment programs. That
evaluation should now be broadened to take into account medium- and
long-term incentives that might offset the effects of the basic short-term
incentives. To appreciate the medium-term incentive, consider the
HMO that is thinking about cutting costs by withholding reasonable
tests and treatments. If it chooses this course, some of its patients'
diseases will worsen before they finally demand attention. The
HMO's contract will then impose on the HMO the burden of provid-
ing the medical treatments which these advanced diseases require." 9
In general, the HMO's perception of its eventual contractual responsi-
bilities clearly gives it a medium-term incentive to avoid undue econo-
mies in its original provision of tests and treatments. 120
The long-term incentive relates to the external market for HMOs.
Consider the HMO that has already received its annual premium and
therefore has an immediate incentive to practice parsimony in the fur-
nishing of medical services. This parsimony can easily result in pa-
tient dissatisfaction. If patients sign up directly with HMOs, at the end
of the policy year they can vote with their feet and decline to renew
their relationship with the HMO. Under the various proposals for na-
tional health care plans, the contract with the HMO may be entered
into not by patients themselves but rather by employers or health alli-
ances. Yet if employees convey to their employers their dissatisfaction
with the HMO, or if citizens convey their dissatisfaction to their health
alliances, the employer and the health alliance will be less willing to
renew their arrangement with the HMO at the end of the policy year.
The market can therefore serve to discourage HMOs from delivering
substandard medical care.
117 See Hillman's conclusion that "[c ] ertain financial incentives, especially when used
in combination, suggest conflicts of interest that may influence physicians' behavior and
adversely affect the quality of care." Hillman, supra note 106, at 1743. For a discussion of
how many "modem IPAs give physicians an incentive to underutilize," see Welch, supra
note 106, at 735.
118 Robert Pear, Once in Forefront, H.M.O.'s Lose Their Luster in Health Debate, N.Y. TIMEs,
Aug. 23, 1994, at A12. Bills introduced in the House and Senate therefore would have
placed particular restrictions on HMO's methods of operation.
119 For example, the cost-containment decision to discharge a patient prematurely can
end up imposing costs on the health insurer once complications develop, requiring the
rehospitalization of the patient and eventual surgery. See infra text accompanying notes
129-32 (discussing a case with these facts).
120 See Michael W. Weinstein, The Freedom to Choose Doctors: What Freedom?, N.Y. TIMES
MAO., Mar. 27, 1994, at 64, 65.
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HMOs thus face both a medium-term contract incentive and a
long-term market incentive that can counter the basic short-term ten-
dency towards underutilization. Unfortunately, however, these incen-
tives by no means eliminate the tendency. As for the medium-term
incentive, the HMO's contractual liability extends only to the costs of
medical care. The HMO is not liable for income losses that the pa-
tient might incur on account of his disease or for his nonmonetary
costs, such as pain and suffering and lost enjoyments. Since the
health care costs of diseases may be no more than twenty-five percent
of their entire costs, the HMO contract goes only part way toward cost
internalization. Furthermore, consider the patient who might suffer
the harm of death if the HMO originally provides him with inade-
quate tests or services.12' Death is a particularly adverse result which,
far from expanding the HMO's obligation to provide subsequent
medical treatments, eliminates that obligation altogether. When
treating a patient with a disease that will probably but not certainly
prove fatal,122 the very high cost of treatment may give the HMO an
incentive to prematurely abandon the possibility of survival.' 23 In ad-
dition, consider the HMO that is thinking of skimping on such pre-
ventive measures as vaccinations for children, or full diagnostic work-
ups for infants exhibiting signs of developmental problems. The dis-
eases and problems which these vaccinations prevent might well afflict
patients years later. The HMO that fails to provide such a vaccination
or work-up might readily assume that it will no longer be responsible
when the problem finally materializes. 124 The very circumstance of
patient mobility that provides some credibility for the long-term mar-
ket incentive reduces the value of the medium-term contract
incentive.
121 Consider the facts in the case discussed infra text accompanying notes 133-35.
122 Consider the facts in the case discussed infra text accompanying notes 136-41.
123 Of course, in these cases the HMO's ability to avoid apparently excessive expendi-
tures also acquires a special relevance. A high fraction of all Medicare costs is incurred in
the last half-year before death. See Hilary Stout, Clinton 's Health Plan Must Face Huge Costs of
a Person's Last Days, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 1993, at A9.
124 See Weisbrod, supra note 78, at 542 n.38. For discussion of the apparent inadequacy
of the services provided by HMOs to children with possible developmental problems, see
Elizabeth J. Jameson & Elizabeth Wehr, Drafting National Health Care Reform Legislation to
Protect the Health Interests of Children, 5 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 152, 161-63 (1993). Recent
studies suggest that some HMOs are doing an inadequate job in providing childhood vac-
cinations. SeeJonathan E. Fielding et al., Immunization Status of Children of Employees in a
Large Corporation, 271 JAMA 525, 527-28 (1994); Thomas Schlenker & Kathleen Fessler,
Measles in Milwaukee, WISCONSIN MED. J., July 1990, at 403; David Wood et al., Access to
Infant Immunizations for Poor Inter-City Families: What Is the Impact of Managed Care?, 5 J.
HEALTH CARE FOR THE POOR & UNDERSERVED 112 (1994). Note, however, that the last two
of these studies focus on Medicaid HMOs. The low reimbursement rate offered by Medi-
caid, and the high turnover rate among patients enrolled in Medicaid HMOs, may explain
some of those studies' results.
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As for the long-term incentive, a basic problem is that patients,
lacking information, may not be able to observe or assess the quality
of the care they receive. 125 In addition, patients, having established
relationships with one set of doctors, can find it very disruptive to shift
to another set; this disruption obviously impairs consumer mobility.
Certainly an employer, having affiliated itself with a particular HMO,
will encounter resistance from many of its employees if it considers
shifting to another HMO. Furthermore, there are bound to be what
economists call "imperfections" in the process by which patients trans-
mit their dissatisfactions to employers and health alliances and in
which employers and health alliances then bargain with patients' in-
terests in mind. 26 Even now, there is anecdotal evidence that when
employers shop for HMOs they place far more weight on the cost of
the HMO than on the quality of the services the HMO undertakes to
deliver.127
The analysis developed up to this point can now be restated. The
basic economic structure of HMOs gives them a basic short-term in-
centive to practice conservation and even parsimony in their delivery
of medical services. Moreover, the arrangements that HMOs work out
with their affiliated physicians tend to align those physicians' incen-
tives with the incentives of the HMOs themselves. The good result is
the HMO's ability to reduce excessive defensive medicine. The bad
result is a tendency for physicians to practice the kind of underutiliza-
tion that the law would deem malpractice. While medium-term and
long-term incentives also operate on HMOs, they go only part way to-
ward solving the underutilization problem created by the short-term
incentives.' 28
125 See Weisbrod, supra note 78, at 541. Of course, if the market could be fully trusted,
there would be little need for the malpractice action even in its traditional setting. Since
patients can refuse to consult those physicians with a propensity for malpractice, the mar-
ket can provide physicians with appropriate incentives to avoid malpractice. Even the
basics of malpractice law, then, rest on the implicit premise that patients lack the informa-
tion or the bargaining ability to render effective this market mechanism. To be sure, em-
ployers or health alliances might be able to gather information or to bargain with
sophistication in a way that would improve the functioning of the market for medical
services.
126 Indeed, the health alliances that the Clinton bill sought to create would have been
monopolies entrenched by federal law and assigned a multitude of tasks, capable of exert-
ing conflicting pressures.
127 See Ron Winslow, In Health Care, Low Cost Beats High Quality, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18,
1994, at 1, B12.
128 At the very least, one can easily predict that on some occasions, HMOs-if only on
account of imperfect management-will succumb to their short-term incentive and deliver
an inadequate level of medical services. When this happens, the malpractice action, if




C. The Tort Suit As a Solution to the Prospective of
Underutilization: The Southern California Trilogy
Given all of this, courts are likely to turn to the malpractice tort to
discourage inadequate care by HMOs and cost-containment decision-
makers. If my own region-southern California-has recently en-
grossed the nation with an amazing combination of riots, fires, earth-
quakes, floods, terrible crimes, and melodramatic criminal trials, it
has also provided the three most important cases dealing with the pos-
sible malpractice liability of organizations that engage in medical cost-
containment efforts. The first of the three was the 1986 case Wickline
v. State of California.129 The plaintiff in Wickline was a Medi-Cal patient
who was hospitalized for surgery on her leg. During treatment, her
doctor sought authorization from Medi-Cal for an additional eight
days of hospitalization. Medi-Cal, with a board-certified surgeon serv-
ing as its consultant, authorized payment for only four additional days.
Because of this, her treating physician discharged her from the hospi-
tal once these four days had elapsed. After her discharge, complica-
tions developed. Because of these complications, she was re-
hospitalized, and eventually her leg was amputated. Alleging that this
amputation was caused by her early release from the hospital, she
brought suit against Medi-Cal. The court of appeal found that the
four-day discharge in fact met the pertinent standard of care: hence
the position taken by Medi-Cal was not improper or negligent. 30 But
the court went out of its way to emphasize in dictum the potential
liability of cost-containment programs. "It is essential that [such pro-
grams] not be permitted to corrupt medical judgment."13' The pa-
tient "who requires treatment and who is harmed when care which
should have been provided is not provided should recover... from all
those responsible . . . . including, when appropriate, health care
payors."' 32
In 1990 came Wilson v. Blue Cross of Southern California.13 3 Here a
patient was hospitalized for major depression. Though his treating
physician believed that four weeks of hospitalization was necessary,
Blue Cross refused to authorize payment for more than ten days.
129 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 republished at 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct. App.), rev. granted, 727
P.2d 753 (Cal. 1986), dismissed, remanded and ordered published, 741 P.2d 613 (Cal. 1987).
130 239 Cal. Rptr. at 818-19.
131 Id. at 820.
132 Id. at 819.
133 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Ct. App. 1990). A case with facts considerably resembling Wit-
son is Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
812 (1992). In Corcoran, however, the employer's health plan was self-insured, and the
court found that the patient's malpractice claim against the plan's cost-containment ad-
ministrators was preempted by ERISA. The ERISA preemption problem is discussed in
William A. Chittenden III, Malpractice Liability and Managed Health Care: History and Diagno-
sis, 26 ToRT & INs. L.J. 451, 485-92 (1991).
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Since the patient and his family could not afford to pay for future
inpatient care, he was discharged after ten days.' 34 Not long thereaf-
ter, he committed suicide. In the wrongful death action brought by
his family against Blue Cross, the court of appeal, setting aside a sum-
mary judgment for the defendant, ruled that the action could proceed
to trial. The court squarely rejected the idea that any "important pub-
lic policy" in favor of utilization review should restrict the scope of
liability.13 5
The third case, Fox v. Health Net, went to trial in December
1993.136 Nelene Fox, enrolled in the Health Net HMO, was suffering
from advanced breast cancer. After she had been evaluated by a
Health Net oncologist,137 she was referred to specialists at the Univer-
sity of Southern California Medical Center, who thought that she was
an appropriate candidate for a bone-marrow transplant. However, the
HMO's associate medical director, in charge of the HMO's utilization
review program decided not to approve the transplant. This decision-
maker almost certainly took into account the $150,000 cost of the
transplant procedure. Fox family members, however, were eager for
the transplant, and were eventually able to raise the funds to finance
the procedure themselves. The August, 1992 transplant may well have
been successful in extending Nelene Fox's life by a few months and in
providing her with additional quality time with her family. Even so,
she died of cancer in April, 1993. Before her death, she and her hus-
band filed suit against Health Net, alleging the tortious infliction of
emotional distress; her brother was the family's lawyer in this suit.
134 Because of the patient's limited financial resources, the court was able to conclude
that Blue Cross's refusal to pay for further hospitalization was in a sufficiently meaningful
sense a "cause" of the discharge. Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 883. The Fox case, discussed
below in text accompanying notes 136-41, suggests how complicated the causation issue
can get. For an interesting recent discussion of causation, seeJonathanJ. Frankel, Medical
Malpractice Law and Health Care Cost Containment: Lessons for Reformers from the Clash of Cul-
tures, 103 YALE L.J. 1297, 1328 (1994).
135 Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
What is here set forth is a somewhat simplified account of Wilson. The health insur-
ance contract in that case seemed to say that the contract covered hospitalization whenever
the insured's physician decided that hospitalization was necessary. Id. at 880. Accordingly,
the very creation of the cost-containment program that enabled the insurer to reject the
physician's recommendation could be regarded as a breach of contract. Id. at 881. In-
deed, this contract argument in Wilson tended to subordinate the wrongful-death negli-
gence argument that my text here emphasizes.
136 The following paragraph draws on Erik Eckholm, $89 Million Awarded Against Fam-
ily Who Sued H.M. 0., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1993, at Al; Tom Gorman, Jury Adds $77 Million
Against HMO that Denied Coverage L. Tims, Dec. 29, 1993, at A3; Telephone Interview
with Mark Hiepler (plaintiffs' counsel), Feb. 17, 1994; Telephone Interview with Lyle Swal-
low (defense counsel), Feb. 23, 1994.
Not surprisingly, the accounts of the evidence that I have received from opposing
counsel differ in important respects; and I have not attempted to resolve those differences.
137 Opposing counsel have provided me with quite different accounts of the substance
of this oncologist's evaluation.
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The suit went to trial after her death.13 8 In December, 1993, the jury
awarded $12 million in compensatory damages, and an additional $77
million in punitive damages.
While bone-marrow transplants are effective in dealing with cer-
tain cancers such as leukemia, their efficacy in cases of advanced
breast cancer is currently uncertain (and under study by the federal
government).139 The transplant procedure, as noted above, is quite
expensive. Also, it requires a considerable period of hospitalization
and carries a five percent risk of death. While Mrs. Fox's contract
specified that Health Net would not provide her with "experimental"
treatments, it also indicated that bone-marrow transplants were "cov-
ered services." 140 As for the Health Net associate medical director, he
was eligible for an annual bonus geared to the company's overall prof-
itability. Plaintiffs' evidence tended to identify an additional bonus,
tailored to the associate medical director's success in "optimizing"
medical care within the particular provider group. However, the de-
fendant's evidence tended to show that this second bonus, while pro-
posed, had never been implemented. 141
In assessing the significance of this trio of cases, one can employ
the facts in Wickline, in which the patient's physician wanted eight days
of hospitalization, and Medi-Cal approved only four. These facts are
especially useful, since hospitalization days play a large role in the
overall costs that a health plan incurs. Assume now that the cost-bene-
ficial period of hospitalization would be six days. Traditional fee-for-
service might result in eight days of hospitalization, thereby producing
excessive defensive medicine. On its facts, then, Wickline shows how
such a program can be successful in achieving a desirable cost-con-
tainment goal. Yet the momentum of cost containment on HMO
decisionmaking might result in the further reduction of the patient's
138 The medical evidence available to the plaintiffs' attorney did not indicate that the
delay in the transplant was the probable cause of her death. Accordingly, the lawsuit did
not include a wrongful death claim.
139 See Eckholm, supra note 136, at 57.
140 Defense counsel reconciles these two clauses by suggesting that the contract guar-
antees bone-marrow transplants when they are medically appropriate (for example, in a
leukemia case) but not when they are medically uncertain (as with advanced breast
cancer).
The plaintiffs' evidence in Fox showed that Health Net had provided bone-marrow
transplants to two other patients. Health Net offered explanations as to why these two
patients were atypical. The jury's punitive damage award suggests that the jury rejected
these explanations and perceived that the HMO had treated Mrs. Fox in a disfavored way.
A recent survey finds a lack of uniformity in how insurance companies treat patients who
seek bone-marrow transplants. See William P. Peters & Mark C. Rogers, Variation in Ap-
proval by Insurance Companies of Coverage for Autologous Bone-Marrow Transplantation for Breast
Cancer, 330 NEw ENG.J. MED. 473 (1994). Not only were there variations among different
insurers, but the same insurance company would often treat its own insureds in
nonuniform ways.
141 It is unclear how the jury resolved this conflict in the evidence.
1372 [Vol. 79:1339
A NATIONAL HEALTH CARE PROGRAM
hospital stay from six days down to four. This is a result that looks like
malpractice. Given its facts, Wilson suggests how cost-containment re-
views might be the source of malpractice. In a society, then, which
increasingly relies on cost containment and HMOs, the malpractice
tort as affirmed by the Wickline dictum acquires an important new
function-offsetting the incentives for malpractice that these institu-
tional arrangements seem capable of providing.
The counter incentives provided by these cases are already affect-
ing the behavior of health-care institutions. HMOs are responding to
decisions such as Fox by making certain tests and procedures more
readily available.' 42 However, even if one appreciates that cases like
Wilson and Fox provide a possible solution to the problem with cost-
containment programs, one may wonder whether they provide an in-
telligent solution. Malpractice litigation, even in its ordinary contexts,
inspires concerns about the competence of the jury to render intelli-
gent decisions on malpractice issues. The problem of jury compe-
tence looms especially large as one considers the new responsibility
that is assigned to the jury by the Wickline dictum. For that matter, if
the actual goal of cost-containment programs is to properly balance
the health benefits of medical services and the costs associated with
those services, a special problem is that juries have often proved hos-
tile to the core public-policy idea that high monetary costs can justify a
reduction in health or safety.143
Fox itself provides an interesting illustration of the range of
problems. From what an outsider can tell,'" the jury in Fox might
have reached the right result in finding liability. But it also is possible
that the jury erred in an emotional way in imposing liability for com-
pensatory and especially punitive damages.' 45 At the very least, when
cases like Wilson and Fox go to juries, there is considerable uncertainty
as to jury verdicts. This uncertainty can perplex defendants who want
to account for the prospect of liability, and can lead to a variety of
undesirable behavioral responses. 46
142 See George Anders, More Insurers Pay for Care That's in Trials, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15,
1994, at B1, B6; Gina Kolata, Patients' Lauyers Lead Insurers to Pay for Unproven Treatments,
N.Y. TrmEs, Mar. 28, 1994, at Al, All; Thomas H. Maugh II, Costly New Treatments Put
Insurers in Quandary, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1994, at Al, A20.
143 See Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case 43 RuTGERs L. REv. 1013, 1035-
47 (199:) (describing "basic public beliefs").
144 See supra note 136.
145 The Fox case was settled by the parties in early April 1994, at a time when posttrial
motions were still pending. The amount of the settlement was not announced. See Law
Note, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 1994, at B5.
146 For careful consideration of the impact on defendants of uncertain liability rules,
see John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal
Standards, 70 VA. L. Rxv. 965 (1984); Mark F. Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of Negli-
gence, 92 YALE L.J. 799 (1983).
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D. Contract Law and Federal Law
Part C has suggested that a national care health program, by en-
couraging cost containment programs and HMOs, might well en-
courage courts to turn to the malpractice tort to discourage what
courts would perceive as incentives for the provision of inadequate
care. That Part then went on to consider whether the malpractice
action is selective enough and intelligent enough to get this job done
well. Let me now extend my analysis by showing how the legal formats
of HMOs and a national health care program can eclipse or
subordinate the patient's malpractice claim. Indeed, a national pro-
gram could easily lead to the federalization of a body of law that until
now has been exclusively under the domain of the state malpractice
tort.
One alternative remedy stems from the contractual relationship
between the HMO and the patient (or the employer or health alliance
that represents the patient). The underlying contract might well limit
the HMO's obligations. Assume, for example, that the contract speci-
fies that the HMO will provide no more than twenty sessions of psy-
chotherapy per year;147 assume further that a patient alleges that the
termination of psychotherapy after twenty sessions was unreasonable
in a Learned Hand sense and caused him to suffer the harm of in-
tense emotional distress. This tort claim would fail: the limitations
built into the HMO's contractual commitment would confine the
reach of the findings that a malpractice jury might otherwise render.
On the other hand, the HMO contract might affirmatively specify that
certain health services-for example, particular vaccinations-will be
provided by the HMO. If the HMO then fails to do so, the patient has
a breach-of-contract claim that would largely subordinate whatever
malpractice claim she might have. Recall that in the Fox case, the
plaintiffs relied in part on the contract language suggesting that
Health Net would pay for bone-marrow transplants. 148
Furthermore, the HMO contract typically contains certain gen-
eral terms to describe the services provided by the HMO. For exam-
ple, the HMO might commit itself to affording all services that are
"medically necessary."149 Assume that the HMO declines to provide
mammograms to patients under fifty, that this disinclination prevents
147 This is the condition in the contract that the Kaiser-Permanente HMO offers to
UCLA employees. See KAISER-PERMANENTE, YOUR HEALTH PLAN IN DETAIL 6 (1993). The
contract also excludes "experimental or investigative services" and provides a paragraph-
long definition. Id. at 44-45. If it were clear that a breast cancer treatment such as a bone-
marrow transplant is experimental, then the HMO would be free of liability in a case such
as Fox.
148 See supra text accompanying note 140.
149 This is the general language in the program that Health Net offers UCLA employ-
ees. HEALTH NET, DiscLosuRE FORM PLAN D2, at 3 (1993). On the meaning of this Ian-
1374 [Vol. 79:1339
A NATIONAL HEALTH CARE PROGRAM
the HMO from detecting a forty-seven-year-old patient's breast cancer,
and that the failure to promptly diagnose the cancer results in the
patient's death. The patient may possibly have a claim against the
HMO for malpractice, but the patient can also argue that the HMO
has breached its contract. Next assume that the HMO obstetrician
declines to perform a caesarian section for a patient who is beginning
a difficult delivery, and that the infant emerges with a birth defect that
a caesarian might have prevented. This patient can sue the HMO phy-
sician for his own malpractice; but it is possible that she can also sue
the HMO, alleging breach of contract. In a society of HMOs, then,
contract claims can combine with and possibly subordinate tort
claims.
To be sure, the contract claim in question, like the tort claim,
would arise under state law and would be primarily litigated in state
courts. Furthermore, the American legal tradition has been to
subordinate contract standards to tort standards when patients sue be-
cause of the adverse results of medical care. The law, for example, has
disfavored patients' claims that the doctor has violated a promise to
cure.1 50 State courts probably would rely on this legal tradition when
they consider the patient's claim against the HMO. Accordingly, the
HMO's contractual obligation to provide "medically necessary" serv-
ices would be interpreted in light of the physician's own tort obliga-
tion to provide reasonable and customary care in treating her
patients. Indeed, the general language in one HMO contract I have
consulted obliges the HMO to provide those procedures that are
"generally and customarily provided to patients residing in the Service
Area." 15' This contract norm is drafted in a way that renders it a pre-
cise equivalent of the traditional malpractice norm. In all, then, when
patients suing HMOs rely on both a common-law malpractice theory
and a contract theory that depends on the general language in the
HMO's disclosure form, the malpractice theory is likely to dominate
the resolution of their suits.
Consider now how the situation would change if a national health
care program is adopted. Most of the bills that Congress recently con-
sidered insisted on some "standard benefit package" of health insur-
ance coverage. 152 Accordingly, once a national program is approved,
guage in standard fee-for-service health insurance contracts, see infra text accompanying
note 155.
150 See Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183, 186 (Mass. 1973) (requiring "clear" proof
of the existence of such a promise).
151 KAISER-PERMANENTE, supra note 147, at 36.
152 There is a unitary one-size-fits-all quality to these standard benefit packages. I am
therefore puzzled by the suggestion of Professors Henderson and Siliciano that the adop-
tion of a national health care program would lead to greater diversity in the health service
packages offered to various groups. SeeJames A. Henderson,Jr. &John A. Siliciano, Univer-
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the dimensions of HMO's obligations will be largely controlled by fed-
eral statutory requirements. Some of the bills recently considered by
Congress went into considerable detail in their definitions of cover-
age. If any program that Congress finally approves mandates certain
vaccinations, then an HMO that fails to provide such a vaccination
would violate its federally imposed obligation, and would apparently
bear liability for whatever harms result. Yet, if the specifics of the fed-
eral statute could create liability, they could limit liability as well. The
Clinton bill, for example, would have expected HMOs to provide
mammograms only to women over the age of fifty.153 Had this bill
been enacted, the HMO that failed to provide a mammogram to its
forty-seven-year-old patient would probably be shielded from liability
when the absence of a mammogram prevents it from detecting the
patient's breast cancer.
Moreover, most of the bills Congress recently considered em-
ployed certain general terms in expressing the scope of mandated
benefits. "Medically necessary" was a term commonly utilized; the
Clinton bill itself would have required health plans to provide all serv-
ices that are "medically necessary or appropriate."' 5 4 The language of
"medically necessary" is currently common in health insurance con-
tracts, and "medically necessary" is often interpreted broadly as mean-
ing "medically appropriate" rather than "medically imperative."155
But in dealing with health insurance contracts, courts have found this
concept difficult to understand. They have divided, for example, on
its application to treatments such as bone-marrow transplants. 156
Moreover, judicial opinions have failed to clarify the extent to which
economic costs are a relevant or important variable in understanding
a "medical necessity" clause. Unfortunately, none of the bills consid-
ered by Congress provided any real definition of the "medically neces-
sary" concept. Since the meaning of the concept seems essential in
sal Health Care and the Continued Reliance on Custom in Determining Medical Malpractice, 79
CORNELL L. REv. 1382 (1994). But see supra note 67 and accompanying text.
153 S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1114(h) (2) (B) (1993).
154 Id. § 1141 (a).
155 See Hall & Anderson, supra note 106, at 1646 n.27. In the context of fee-for-service
health insurance, the "medically necessary" standard comes in at the second level of deci-
sionmaking. At the first level, the patient's physician decides on whether the patient
should receive a particular medical service. Only after the physician has determined what
services should be offered does the insurer review those determinations under a "medically
necessary" standard for purposes of reimbursement. In the context of a national health
program, "medically necessary" assumes a more central role: it becomes the criterion for
determining what services should originally be provided by physicians.
156 Id. at 1637-40.
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any assessment of either the efficiency or the justice 157 of the various
bills, the absence of a definition is unfortunate.' 58
Under the Clinton bill, decisions as to what services are "medi-
cally necessary or appropriate" would initially have been rendered by
the physicians and the managers of health plans. But when a recur-
ring issue arises, the bill would have assigned to the National Health
Board the authority to determine whether a particular service is "med-
ically necessary or appropriate."159 Such an administrative agency
could, for example, decide under what circumstances bone-marrow
transplants are medically necessary or appropriate. 60 Moreover, in
the course of deciding the bone-marrow transplant issue, the agency
might articulate some general definition of the "medically necessary
or appropriate" concept. Under the Chevron doctrine,' 61 federal
courts would be required to defer to the agency's interpretation of the
admittedly ambiguous statutory term, so long as that interpretation is
"reasonable." Once a regulation has been adopted and judicially af-
firmed, the legal system would no longer need to rely on individual
damage actions such as Fox to assess the acceptability of withholding a
bone-marrow transplant.
Furthermore, even if the medical service denied by the patient's
health plan had not yet been considered by the agency, the Clinton
bill sought to provide administrative procedures by which patients
could complain about the health plan's decision.162 These proce-
dures were elaborate-indeed, so elaborate that when the bill was in-
troduced industry lawyers complained that health plans would be
unduly pressured to provide excessive services. 163 At any rate, the
availability of a complaint procedure, enabling the patient prospec-
tively to demand medical services, can serve as an alternative to tort
157 See Ronald Dworkin, Will Clinton's Plan Be Fair?, N.Y. Rv. OF BooKs, Jan. 13, 1994,
at 20, 22.
158 This absence was no doubt strategic; drafters of each bill probably perceived that
any effort to provide a definition would prove excessively divisive among the groups they
hoped to enlist in a coalition supporting the bill.
159 S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1141(a)(2) (1993).
160 See Dworkin, supra note 157. The Board would have rendered such decisions
through regulations. S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1154 (1993). The bill was silent as to
the procedures accompanying regulation drafting. Accordingly, these procedures-in-
cluding an eventual right ofjudicial review-would evidently have been determined by the
Administrative Procedure Act, and its particular requirements for informal rule making. 5
U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
161 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
893-44 (1984).
162 S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 5201-14 (1993) (outlining the procedures for sub-
mitting claims and filing grievances).
163 Robert Macauley, Jr., Clinton's Proposed Amendments to ERISA Threaten to Undo the
Cost-Containment Gains Achieved Under Managed Care, NAT'L LJ., Jan. 31, 1994, at 29.
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cases such as Wickline and Wilson, in which patients seek retrospective
damages for harm caused by the withholding of medical services.
Yet as extensive as the claims procedures in a national health care
program might be, certain practical conditions must be satisfied
before the procedures can be utilized. One condition relates to tim-
ing. Take the doctor who decides (perhaps unwisely) not to perform
a caesarian section for a pregnant woman who is beginning a difficult
birth process. This woman obviously has no time to file a claim or
grievance seeking a caesarian. The second condition concerns pa-
tient knowledge. Before filing a claim, the patient would need to
know that there is some possibly beneficial medical service she is not
receiving. In some cases, as in Fox, the patient will learn of the service
being withheld. But in other cases, the patient may lack this knowl-
edge.164 If, for example, an HMO simply tells a patient that four days
of hospitalization is enough, she might be unaware of the extent to
which she would benefit by six or eight days. Moreover, the informed-
consent doctrine, as currently interpreted, does not obligate the doc-
tor to advise his patients of the services that he is not providing, and
what all their pros and cons might be.165
Consider now the ophthalmologist who does not include a pres-
sure test in a routine eye exam.166 As a result, his patient's glaucoma
escapes detection. 167 Assume further that the administrative agency
has not yet issued regulations on whether the pressure test is "medi-
cally necessary," and that the circumstances surrounding the physi-
cian's omission did not provide the patient with a realistic opportunity
to file a statutory "claim." If the patient wants to sue after-the-fact for
damages suffered, what legal theories are available to her? Presuma-
bly she can file a state-law malpractice action against the physician and
(depending on vicarious liability doctrines) against the HMO as well.
But can the patient, in bringing suit against the HMO, rely on her
allegation of the HMO's violation of the federal "medically necessary"
requirement? Whether the federal program authorizes a federal-law
cause of action against the HMO for falling to afford a "medically nec-
essary" service would of course depend on the exact language of the
164 Glenn Ruffenbach, Medicine: Debate Grows Over Rationing Medical Care WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 27, 1990, at B1.
165 See, e.g., Parris v. Sands, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 800 (Ct. App. 1993). But these cases might
well be reconsidered as courts perceive both that cost containment is the basis for the doc-
tor's disinclination and that only by providing patients with information will patients be
able to take advantage of the national program's claims procedure. For a debate among
scholars, compare Mark A. Hall, Informed Consent to Rationing Decisions, 71 MILBANK Q. 645
(1993) with Paul S. Appelbaum, Must We Forgo Informed Consent to Control Health Care Costs?
A Response to Mark A. Ha, 71 MILBANK Q. 669 (1993).
166 See Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974).
167 Routine eye exams, though often excluded from private health insurance, would
have been covered by the Clinton bill. S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1125 (1993).
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federal statute. In any event, the federal "medically necessary" stan-
dard would become a key feature in the patient's own contract with
the HMO. Therefore, the patient can probably invoke "medically nec-
essary" in suing the HMO for breach of contract under state law. To
be sure, this suit would bristle with complications. Does the suit "arise
under federal law" so as to confer original jurisdiction on federal
courts?16 8 If so, does that federal court have pendent jurisdiction 16 9
over the patient's state-law malpractice claim against the particular
physician?
Yet whether the physician's combination of claims is litigated in
federal court or state court, one point is clear enough. The federal
character of the "medically necessary" issue in the plaintiff's claim
means that state malpractice law would lose its primacy in determin-
ing what services doctors are obliged to provide to their patients. As-
sume that the failure to provide a pressure test does not depart from
professional custom and hence does not count as malpractice under
state law. Even so, if federal law is interpreted as regarding the pres-
sure test as "medically necessary," the patient's suit would evidently be
a winner.1 70 Given its federal character, state courts would be unable
to merge the "medically necessary" issue into the state's own malprac-
tice standard. Accordingly, once a national health care plan is
adopted, many of the lawsuits that now proceed as state-law malprac-
tice actions will become lawsuits dominated by federal statutory stan-
dards. Whether a glaucoma pressure test should be included in
routine eye exams is a question that until now has been resolved by
state-court judges and juries. 171 Yet under a national program, this
question would instead be decided by the United States Supreme
Court.172
CONCLUSION
The basic findings and suggestions of this Article can here be
summarized. The Clinton bill would have taken the important step of
168 See Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986) (state-law
cause of action that incorporates federal standard does not arise under federal law).
169 See CHARLEs A. WIGrr, LAw oF FEDERAL COURTS 103-09 (4th ed. 1983) (discussing
pendent jurisdiction).
170 What if the HMO does provide the patient with all services that are "medically nec-
essary" in the federal-law sense? Would full compliance with the federal standard prevent a
jury from concluding as a matter of state malpractice law that there are additional services
the doctor should have provided? The answer to this question would depend on the
proper interpretation of the precise statutory language.
171 See, e.g., Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974).
172 Recurring and important issues might eventually be addressed by an agency regula-
tion. Once such a regulation is promulgated, federal courts, as a matter ofjudicial review,
would subject this regulation to a hard look. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (adopting the "hard look" approach).
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reversing the collateral source rule in medical malpractice cases.
Moreover, if adopted, a national health care program might well lead
to the repeal of the collateral source rule in all tort cases, at least in its
application to health insurance. The rule makes the most sense when
insurance is uncommon, is the product of individual choice, and is
paid for out of the individual's own pocketbook. If health insurance
becomes universal, mandated by government, and financed in signifi-
cant part by government, the rule would lose its commonsense fair-
ness basis. To be sure, one alternative to the outright abrogation of
the rule would be to recognize subrogation rights for health insurers
against tortfeasors. Whether subrogation makes sense depends on a
difficult comparison of the overhead entailed by subrogation and the
deterrence it could provide.
Any repeal of the collateral source rule as applied to health care
benefits would significantly reduce the size of tort awards. Also, a na-
tional program, reimbursing for medical expenses, would reduce vic-
tims' practical need to turn to the tort system to secure compensation.
In light of this, the adoption of such a program would probably turn
out to restrain the number of tort claims filed. Moreover, such a pro-
gram would assure juries and judges that accident victims are free of
the burden of heavy medical bills. Given this assurance, the program
would somewhat reduce the proplaintiff bias ofjuries and dampen the
liability-expanding ardor of appellate judges.
Such a program would also reinforce and accelerate the revolu-
tion that American medicine has recently been undergoing. That
revolution seems capable of reducing the amount of inappropriate
defensive medicine. It likewise should be able to lower the malprac-
tice standard of care from the unduly lofty level it evidently has
attained during the modem era. At the same time, the new arrange-
ments this revolution is bringing about give health care providers
temptations for underutilization in the provision of tests and proce-
dures. Courts are likely to turn to the malpractice action as a device
for resisting these temptations. But the malpractice action may be too
blunt an instrument to perform well in this regard. In any event, a
national health care program would threaten the future of the tradi-
tional malpractice tort in its application to the tests and procedures
that doctors provide. Under such a program, controversies concern-
ing the provision of appropriate tests and procedures would increas-
ingly be governed by federal statutory and regulatory standards.
The public debate about the tort aspects of health care reform
has mainly concerned the restrictions that various plans would explic-
itly place on malpractice claims. 173 My conclusion here is that this
173 See, e.g., Herbert, supra note 77; George McGovern, A Sneak Attack on Malpractice
Reform, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 1994, at A12.
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debate has been shortsighted, inasmuch as it has failed to identify and
deal with the wide variety of ways in which a national health care pro-
gram could significantly affect the entire tort system, especially its mal-
practice component. Few of these consequences can be regarded as
having been intended by the authors and sponsors of the various
plans. Yet the law of unintended consequences is quite familiar. In
any event, many of those consequences are at least foreseeable; and
this Article can be understood as an exercise in foresight.
As such, the Article has been primarily positive rather than nor-
mative. But at times it has included normative elements. For exam-
ple, its perception that a national health care program would likely
displace the collateral source rule derives from its assessment that the
program's insurance benefits would be understood as not complying
with the assumptions about collateral sources that provide the rule
with its basic appeal. Similarly, its suggestion that judges will assign a
new function to the malpractice tort is based on its understanding
that modem arrangements for the delivery of medical services pose a
real problem, and that judges will hence turn to the malpractice tort
as a possible solution to that problem. Yet its concern for the impreci-
sion of the malpractice doctrine has led the Article to cast doubt on
the wisdom of that solution.
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